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COMMENT

Playing People Cheap

Richard Wright tells of a singularly descriptive phrase that Negroes use to characterize the attitude of Southern Whites toward them: They play people cheap! This comes to mind as one glances over the current debates in and out of Washington on the question of aiding Europe.

Representative John Taber, chairman of the crucially important House Appropriations Committee recently returned from a trip through the horror and misery, the decaying and rotting body of what once was Europe, reports that Europeans are lazy and do not show any signs of undernourishment. They are in fact "moderately plump."

At long last President Truman has at least called a special session of Congress. This, it is to be ardently hoped, will result in some action. Thus far, it is only fair to report, American statesmen for the most part have tended to regard the issue of help to Europe as "hot potatoes" politically. The coming elections have cast their long shadow over the American scene. But while in America this is only the shadow of defeat for one or the other political party, it is the shadow of death for millions of Europeans.

Mr. John McCloy, president of the International Bank (sometimes even bankers have vision), has stated the issue most succinctly: "The world cannot exist half skyscraper and half rubble." But Those statesmen with the mentality of ward politicians cannot bring themselves to think of rubble; they are too concerned with the coming elections in the land of the skyscraper. They fail to comprehend that if Europe is engulfed by a tide of misery, totalitarianism and despair, if America is faced with several hundred million starving, shivering people willing to engage in no matter what desperate adventure, even the seat of the mighty from the Tenth Ward may begin to shake. They PLAY PEOPLE CHEAP!

Yes, we are well aware that they talk of the Marshall plan. Some think of it as a blood transfusion for moribund Europe; but, as a columnist recently pointed out: "A blood transfusion is of little use if the patient is already dead." But it is doubtful if the Tabers

will take notice of this death until the rotten smell of putrefaction stings their nostrils. Until then? "We'll cross that bridge when we come to it" is their motto.

It should be apparent, however, that we reached the edge of that stream a long while ago. The Australian, French and Italian national economies are on the verge of complete collapse. The British situation becomes more desperate every day. U.S. health officials recently reported that in the U.S. sector of Berlin examinations of about 15,000 persons showed the average 20-year-old male to be 30 pounds underweight and females in the same group to be 25 pounds below normal.

Congressional leaders called to the White House early in October were told that only $580 million was needed to keep Europe alive from September 1 until next March, i.e. over a winter that promises to be the most disastrous Europe has yet known. This is a most modest sum, a tiny fraction of what has been going into defense appropriations in recent years. The calculations underlying it are based on the doubtful assumption that only France, Italy and Austria will need relief and that the Marshall plan will be in operation by March. Yet even this dole will evidently be granted—if it is to be granted at all—at ten minutes to twelve—i.e. sometime in December perhaps if Congress acts promptly.

Appropriations are a legislative prerogative but there are a number of measures which at least could have insured that enough food would be available for immediate shipment to Europe once Congress acts. Past experience has shown that restrictions on use of grain are worth more than any number of appeals for "voluntary rationing." Yet no such measures to conserve grain for export are being invoked. Fact-finding committees and voluntary rationing appeals cannot possibly result in the necessary surpluses at the pierhead. As a British journalist puts it: "While the examination continues, the wheat goes irretrievably into the hogs."

We can think of no more appropriate ending to this piece than to quote from an article in the London *Economist* of October 11th. This sober and factual journal certainly can scarcely be accused of any tendency toward hysteria. It states:

"The gods of history are fond of irony, and doubtless when they survey the fumblings and the fears and the hesitations and the downright refusals of the Western World, as it now shivers before the necessary decisions and the necessary acts, they are looking into a future in which all those decisions and acts will have been achieved

not by the choice of free men but by the iron compulsion of necessity. Dictatorship of the Right or of the Left will have shattered European democracy and broken the strikes and the spirit of the European worker. . . In America perhaps, at the end of the story, the most inexorable creator of availabilities, the most certain purveyor of rationing and control—war itself—will impose in their crudest and cruellest form the disciplines from which a leaderless America shrinks today."

Operation Cominform

Moscow's *Pravda* (*Truth*) has denied that formation of the new Communist Information Bureau constitutes a rebirth of the Comintern: "The setting up of the Information Bureau by representatives of some Communist parties does not signify at all the restoration of a single world Communist organization with centralized leadership such as the Communist International used to be." In this case *Pravda* tells *a* truth, but not the *whole* truth. The organization established in Belgrade is not simply a reborn Comintern but something really new. However it is not simply an information bureau either, but rather a center from which to launch and direct a very definite and important political operation.

All parties belonging to the Comintern once had a common goal: the Communist World Revolution. But there were no concrete immediate tasks common to all Communist parties. They had —and still have—one permanent function however: to serve the interest of Soviet policy. Consequently in every country each particular section of the Comintern had to fulfill various and changing tasks. The Comintern in this sense was "officially" dissolved; yet it never actually ceased to exist. All Communist parties maintained the same function and continued to be directed from Moscow. The change was merely that of transmission belts. Orders came no more from the Executive Committee of the Comintern (EKKI) but from the Foreign Division of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party. This division has been directed by Malenkov. Its representatives in various countries have played the same role as that formerly played by the so-called "CI reps." This organization was not dissolved; it exists today and is not in anyway replaced by the new body.

The Information Bureau (or Cominform) which operates from

Belgrade does not pretend to be a world organization, nor even an organization embracing all Communist parties in Europe. Obviously directed from Moscow (by Zdhanov and the same Malenkov), its purpose is to organize, direct and co-ordinate the action of nine specially selected Communist parties of which seven are the ruling parties in their respective countries and two (Italy and France) seek to become ruling parties in the near future. The setting up of such a Bureau is, in effect, an announcement on the part of Moscow that it considers the struggle for power in both the last-named countries to be nearing its decisive phase.

According to the Italian Communist leader Longo, who attended the conference of the nine parties, those parties participated in the new organization "whose countries at the present moment are the most threatened by the aggressive designs of imperialism, and can do the most to resist the offensive." And Togliatti declared: "It is precisely to enable us to strive more effectively against the warmongers and in defense of peace that we have made contact with the Communist parties of other countries. We want to organize a wide peace front of all the peoples who no longer want wars—and we shall without doubt succeed."

The announcement of this "peace front," however, sounds suspiciously like a declaration of war. This is exactly how it was meant to sound—not because actual war is in prospect but because the Communists seek to create and strengthen the feeling of war danger. What they need in Europe, and especially in Italy and France, is a permanent and ever-increasing nervous tension, a mounting fear of a new catastrophe, designed to paralyze the people's will to work and to organize their economic life. The Communists seek to create the impression that either power must be given to them or their respective countries will be plunged into hopeless chaos. This, in all probability, is the reason why the "International Bureau" in Belgrade was organized not in secrecy but rather with the most demonstrative and clamorous publicity.

Unfit To Print

The American press is a most peculiar institution. It prides itself on printing "all the news that's fit to print" and yet at times practices a rather astonishing sense of selectivity. On October 14, Kurt Schumacher, head of the German Social Democratic Party,

the leading democratic figure in post-war Germany and one of the most outstanding of Europe's Socialist leaders, addressed the American Federation of Labor convention to which he had been especially invited. The first German socialist to speak in the U.S. since the war, Schumacher delivered what is certainly one of the most important speeches of recent years. It would have been front page news in any other country. Yet the New York *Times* of the following day, though it printed columns reporting the silliest pronouncements of every ward politician who felt like adding his own particular bit of wisdom to the stream of inanities on things European, recorded simply: " . . . and then Mr. Kurt Schumacher addressed the convention."

Schumacher, who suffered in Nazi concentration camps for almost the entire time of the Nazi regime and who today may be considered the living embodiment of the courage and steadfastness of the "other," the anti-Nazi Germany, gave in San Francisco a masterly exposition of the present situation of Germany and Europe. We can quote but a few passages here. Unfortunately, a monthly cannot make up for the faults of the daily press, but these few passages may give an impression of the tenor and significance of his speech.

"The struggle for freedom in one country," Schumacher declared, "has today become the concern of all countries. Is slave labor to become the pillar of economic production or are free workers to carry on the task of building the economy? Forced labor in one country endangers the economic security in other countries. And we still have slave labor in parts of Germany. . . A German Social Democrat can address an American convention only with the knowledge of his European responsibility. Europe has a common destiny. As long as we live in a system of competition of national economies and national states, it will not be possible to halt the descent. . . Germany will then continue to be a burden for Europe and for the world. No country in Europe can support the weakening of another European country. None can prosper through the exploitation of another. The only path to recovery leads through an extensive integration of the economy of Europe. . .

"Germany needs an atmosphere in which the reserves of vitality and trust that are latent in its people can be activated. But such an atmosphere can only be endangered by a continuance of the policies of industrial removals. This will have catastrophic consequences—not only economically but also psychologically. The policies of re-

moval endanger the reorganization of a democratic Germany."

Schumacher went on to castigate the attempts made by Russia to incorporate Germany into her Empire. He stated that if this aim were accomplished it would be "a European catastrophe" and would "strongly endanger world peace." He attacked all attempts from whatever direction to impose on Germany a specific style of life or economic organization.

"It will not do," he declared, "simply to occupy geographic spaces, thinking that thereby one has also conquered the people inhabiting them. On the contrary, one can hold space only if one has first conquered the hearts and minds of the people. Technical, organizational and economic superiority can be secured only if the people who are the support of these things are themselves won over. That is why only those things will endure in Germany that are done through the people's own initiative and their own free will. The people in Germany have to think for themselves, decide for themselves and develop in themselves a sense of responsibility. If an ideology is forcibly imported into Germany, one will only encounter resistance. . . The task is not to import ideologies into Germany but rather the wherewithal to strengthen the will to live. . . The Social Democratic Party is an independent and autonomous party. . . It is a party of honest collaboration but not a party of submission. . . It fights against prejudice, nationalism and dictatorship." [Earlier Mr. Schumacher had stated: "German Social Democracy opposes anti-semitism with the same vigor and uncompromising spirit as that directed toward other forms of totalitarianism. . . We declare that the German people is in honor bound to make reparations and to indemnify the Jews."] "But it knows that all those attempts will come to naught which merely attempt to cure the symptoms of a political sickness. Fascism has been a social sickness."

Only through socialization of the key industries and through breaking the hold of capitalist monopoly can those forces which led Germany to disaster and the horror of Nazism be eradicated, Mr. Schumacher concluded. In his final sentences, he again emphasized the close ties and interdependence between the European and American labor movements: "The suppression of the Social Democrats and the hindrances to the creation of a really free and independent union movement in the Russian zone of Germany constitute a weakening of *world* democracy. On the other hand, the strengthening of the American labor movement is of the utmost importance for the destiny of the European working class."

THE U.S.S.R. VIEWS AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY

FOREWORD

Sidney Hook

The following article by Mr. Dynnik on American philosophy in the March issue of the *Bolshevik* was followed by a companion piece by Mr. Georgi Alexandrov in the July 15th issue of the same magazine. Alexandrov's article was devoted exclusively to John Dewey and entitled "The Philosophizing Armor-Bearers of American Reaction." Its style is even more fiercely abusive than Dynnik's but apparently not abusive enough to please Alexandrov's masters, for soon thereafter he was rebuked by A. Zdhanov, to whom has been delegated the role of cultural Czar by the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party.

These articles are philosophically beneath contempt but very instructive as signs both of the quality of intellectual life in Soviet Russia and the direction of its foreign policy. It is important to remember that they have been written for Russian readers, not American.

It is clear that the Russian regime has already launched, except for overt military action, a total war against the Western democracies, and particularly against the United States whom it now fears most. The "third period" psychology has been revived with the United States cast in the role of the chief enemy, previously assigned to England, France and Germany. Russian cultural life is being purged all along the line in order to reorient the literary storm troopers of the Communist Party to the new task of picturing American culture as completely decadent and corrupt. In order to do this the last lingering notions that Western ideas and practices are progressive in any way must be destroyed together with those whose disavowals were not sufficiently strong to avert suspicion that they still believed something could be learned from the country whose lend-lease had helped Russia withstand Hitler. When Zdhanov purged the Writers Union and banned Zoschenko and Akhmatova

SIDNEY HOOK is Chairman of the Department of Philosophy, New York University and a member of the Editorial Board of *Modern Review*. His latest book is *Education for Modern Man*. He has written extensively on the philosophy of Karl Marx.

in August 1946, he explained that they had fallen under Western influence. When he denounced Alexandrov, he accused him of "servility" to Western philosophy, of "exaggerating" its contributions, and of the crime of "objectivism."

In his address to the Leningrad writers in September 1946, Zhdanov reveals quite bluntly that he is carrying out a political task. "It seems strange to some people that the Central Committee has resorted to such drastic measures in literary matters. . . By its resolution the Central Committee intends to bring the ideological front up to the level of all the other aspects of our work. . . Soviet writers and everyone else who works in the field of ideology are now in the front line. . ." This is an all out call for cultural war.

And so those who are called philosophers in the Soviet Union must carry out their new assignment. To escape the charge of "objectivism" they do not dare to report correctly what American or Western philosophers believe. They must attribute to John Dewey, the author of *Human Nature and Conduct* who definitively refuted the myth that man has a fixed nature, the view that desire for war and private property is part of original human nature, and link him up with "Hegel, Nietzsche and the German Fascists." It all sounds like philosophical burlesque to us because we can read Dewey for ourselves. But to the Russian reader this is additional evidence of imperialist encirclement of the Soviet Union by the United States.

Another significant feature of the current Soviet crusade against American culture is that the main fire is directed against those tendencies in American philosophy which are closest to democratic socialism. This is the Soviet strategy in other spheres, too. The truth is that the Stalin bureaucracy does not fear conservative and reactionary movements. If necessary, it can come to terms with them as it did with Nazi Germany, with Mustapha Kemal, with Mussolini during the Spanish Civil War when it increased its sales of oil to Italy which was then transshipped to Franco's Spain. When this is not possible, it counts upon the stupidity of reactionaries whose policies of undiscriminating opposition to all forms of socialism create the conditions under which communist demagogy is very effective. But Stalin cannot compromise with genuinely democratic and progressive groups. He must destroy them by every means because they appeal to the same strata of the population from which the Communist fifth column seeks to draw mass support. Molotov made no bones about his preference to deal with the Tories rather than the English Labor Party.

II

The way in which the attack on American philosophy is conducted reveals much more about the state of Russian philosophy and culture than about American philosophy.

Note the reference to absolute authorities, the reliance upon Lenin's words as the final truth on all questions of philosophy. Note the characterization of all philosophers who differ at any given moment with the shifting party line as "enemies of the people." They are already in the criminal's dock. They are denounced with the same tones of manufactured vehemence—and with the same kind of manufactured evidence—as the defendants in the notorious Moscow Trials. Allowing for difference in subject matter, Mr. Dynnik's words and tone and theme faithfully reflect the style of Mr. Vishinsky.

Philosophy in the Soviet Union is a matter for the police. And logically so, for to be critical of the state philosophy is to be guilty of treason. The consequence is a dead and dull repetition of safe formulas from the writings of Lenin and Stalin who have been elevated to the rank of great philosophers. The direct and indirect control of philosophic thought is tighter in the Soviet Union than it has ever been in any other country in any other time. Even during the centuries when philosophy was an official handmaiden of Catholic theology, more variation was permitted in philosophic doctrine than under the regime of Stalin.

This intellectual terror prevails in all fields of the social sciences. No criticism whatsoever is permitted of the current official interpretation of any Marxist doctrine. Even silence makes a man suspect. From time to time this terror sweeps through the fields of the natural sciences and physicists and biologists are compelled, on pain of liquidation ,to make obeisances to the dogmas of dialectical materialism.

Whatever may be said about American philosophy—it is free. No Zhdanov lays down the line. None of its works must be approved by a censor. No secret police look over the shoulders of the philosophers as they write, raid and ransack their studies for evidences of philosophic deviation, or hold members of their families as hostages. No authorities are sacred. Its forums and periodicals are open to all points of view including those of American Stalinists. The winds of doctrine blow freely. Argument and reasoned discourse are the only weapons used in the pursuit of clarity and truth. No wonder the American philosophic scene appears to the Soviet philosophic police as one of decadence and corruption.

An amusing aspect of the Soviet diatribe against American philosophy is the way it lumps all philosophic groups together except its own partisans in the field of philosophy. By and large it is true that the leading American pragmatists have been foremost in critizing not only the imperfections of American democracy but also the organized terror of the Soviet dictatorship. But many American philosophers who have accepted the propagandistic abstractions of Soviet official literature at their face value, have been very tender, if not sympathetic, in their judgments on Russia. They are showered with the same abuse as the terrible pragmatists. "Contemporary bourgeois philosophers in America," writes Mr. Dynnik, "represent the reactionary refuse which serves to fertilize the ideological soil of the imperialistic bourgeoisie." This includes the neo-realist, Ralph Barton Perry, who believes in appeasing the Soviet Union and holds that "it has gathered strength from a growth of liberality (!) and industrial freedom." It includes Roy Wood Sellars, the critical realist, who has been very sympathetic to dialectical materialism. It includes the personalist, Edgar Brightman, whose good will to all persons and nations only a self-blinded fanatic cannot see. And it includes many others like Glenn Morrow who subscribe to the strange belief that there is a family likeness between Anglo-American democracy and Soviet Communism on the ground that the slogans and official documents of Soviet ideology sound very much like our own. I call the belief strange since they repudiate—and rightfully!—the notion that because the dictatorship of Franco and Salazar profess to base themselves on the doctrine of "the brotherhood of man under the fatherhood of God" and "the infinite worth and dignity of the individual soul," this makes them members of the same political family as the Anglo-American democracies in which the same phrases are also current.

It is safe to make a few predictions on the basis of the publication of these articles in the *Bolshevik*. They will not be reprinted in *Science and Society,* the Stalinist quarterly, or in other philosophical magazines by American Stalinists who are at the present time assiduously deceiving American readers about the nature of Russian philosophy. But the signal has been given and the American Stalinists with a style more fitting to the American scene will soon launch under their own, as well as under their party names, fierce and abusive attacks against American philosophers, particularly Dewey and other democratic socialists, who cannot be disciplined by the Kremlin.

Philosophy in a free culture has nothing to fear from such attacks. In indicating what progressive ideas the totalitarians fear most, it may even have a genuine educational effect.

CONTEMPORARY BOURGEOIS PHILOSOPHY IN THE U. S.[1]

M. Dynnik

Present-day American bourgeois philosophy is even more reactionary than that of Western Europe. It is especially hostile to progressive ideas both in the natural sciences and in social thought, and serves today as the chief bulwark of international philosophic reaction. It comes into ever closer accord with the reactionary policies of American imperialism.

Contemporary American philosophy is represented by several kindred and overlapping schools or trends, the basic and most widespread of which are: (1) personalism, (2) pragmatism, (3) neo-realism, and (4) critical realism.

In their conception of reality the representatives of all four schools are idealists of the decadent type; in their method they are sophists. Each school expresses, with slight variations, the same decadent idealism and bourgeois sophistry.

I

The first trend—"personalism"—also bears the name of "personalist idealism." It is called that because, declaring that a "world spirit" is the creator of nature, it represents this "world spirit" as a personal spirit.

It is characteristic that every representative of personalism, adding some trifling nuance to the general trend, advertises his wares always under a new name. Thus, Royce calls his doctrine "personal absolutism," Bowne—"personal idealism," Calkins—"absolute personalism," Hocking—"theological personalism," Flewelling—"personalism."

But what essentially is the meaning of all these "isms"? Their essence is the complete fusion of idealism and clericalism. Personalism or "personalist idealism," which declared a "personal universal spirit" to be the creator of the universe, leads directly to religion and turns into religion. Personalism as a whole is the American version of contemporary reactionary fideism.

The reactionary philosophy of personalism is directed against the scientific understanding of nature. Personalism asserts that the real world is apprehended not by science, but by religion. The direct link between American idealism and fideism, the subordination of science to religious dogma—these features of personalism are clearly apparent in all its varieties.

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[1]EDITOR'S NOTE: This article originally appeared in the *Bolshevik* for March 1947. Because of its extreme length, it had to be cut considerably. In this process, however, we have in no way tampered with the text of those passages rendered which present the core of Mr. Dynnik's argument.

The reactionary nature of personalism is revealed with particular force when the spokesmen of this idealist trend attempt to apply its principles to questions of social life. A characteristic effort in this respect was made by Edgar Brightman, who examines the problem of "lasting peace" from the point of view of personalism. Offering the general thesis that "man makes war and man makes peace prompted by his ideas," this personalist philosopher declares that the second world war was nothing but a "conflict of ideas, a battle of concepts." It is scarcely necessary to state that such an "explanation" of the war is aimed at diverting attention from the true social causes of the second world war which are inherent in the system of imperialism itself.

And the hoodwinking of the masses concerning the true causes of war is carried out in order to disarm the peoples in the struggle for peace. Here, for instance, is the panacea recommended by the personalists for the achievement of lasting peace. "I firmly believe," declares the personalist Brightman, "that the world, social justice and human emancipation would make great progress if everyone sincerely adopted a theist faith in an eternal and personal directing principle which controls the actions of the universe." Thus the philosophy of personalism is used for bedeviling and duping the masses in the interests of American reaction which seeks to instigate a new world war.

II

Pragmatism, the second of the above-named schools of contemporary American bourgeois philosophy, conducts the defense of fideism less crudely than personalism, and with greater subtlety. If personalism joins with clericalism directly and unequivocally, basing itself upon the recognition of a personal world spirit, pragmatism conducts its defense of religion taking as its starting point experience, activity, and justifies religion as allegedly useful in practice.

V. I. Lenin, in his book, *Materialism and Empirio-criticism,* gave us a demolishing characterization of pragmatism.

The originator of American pragmatism was Charles Peirce (1839-1914). The basic thesis of Peirce's pragmatism consisted in his denial of the objective reality of the facts of actuality which he interpreted idealistically as subjective experience; in this sense, he reduced the entire significance of facts to their results. The pragmatic thesis proposed by Peirce was not developed in detail by him, but was seized upon by William James (1842-1910), who was the founder of American pragmatism.

Pragmatism, as can be seen from the name itself, proceeds from practice, experience, which it interprets in the spirit of narrow commercial practicality, as it would the success of the conception of a businessman, of his "idea." In the eyes of a pragmatist the success of any idea, even the most nonsensical and reactionary, the fact of the diffusion of any anti-scientific theory or religious belief entirely supplants its truth and renders the question of objective truth superfluous. Pragmatism understands experience in a subjective-idealist sense. The unsoundness of the pragmatic conception of experience is clearly revealed in the light of dialectic materialism.

Dialectic materialism designates as truth that which correctly reflects

actuality, and regards experience as the criterion of truth, since it is by experience that we verify the correspondence with the objective world of our conceptions and ideas of it.

But when the pragmatist puts everything before the judgment seat of experience, he does not in the least seek in experience an answer to the question of the correspondence of ideas to the objective world. Like Machism, pragmatism denies objective truth, standing on the reactionary position of agnosticism. Seconding Machism, pragmatism asserts that an idea manifests its truth through the success of the action which corresponds to this idea, and that only success can divide truth from error. And the idea itself which guides action emerges in the description of pragmatism not as a reflection of apprehended reality, but as a working hypothesis which plays the role of a guide and signifies truth only insofar as it is practically useful. The pragmatist James compares ideas with a credit system and says that ideas and convictions "have potency" only while they are practically useful, just as banknotes have potency until they cease to be accepted. According to James, truth "occurs," "originates" with the idea. The idea "becomes" truth in the process of experience itself.

It is perfectly clear that such a conception of truth and the role of experience as its criterion is absolutely alien to dialectic materialism.

Like Machism, pragmatism is close to the reactionary trend in physics —physical idealism. On the other hand, pragmatism becomes transformed by its representatives into a mainstay for religion. Justification and sanctification of religion directly follow from pragmatism, from its treatment of truth in the sense of something practically advantageous and useful. If it is profitable and useful for the exploiting classes to bedevil the consciousness of the masses by every kind of superstition and prejudice, these superstitions and prejudices, in view of their indubitable advantage and usefulness to the ruling class, are elevated to the status of "truth."

Pragmatism, like personalism, enters into complete contact with clericalism, with the sole distinction that personalism operates with a supernatural and mystical "personal world spirit," and pragmatism utilizes for the same purpose a sophist play upon the concepts "practice," "experience" and "truth."

All these features characterize present-day pragmatism as well. Its most vociferous mouthpiece today is the American philosopher and sociologist, John Dewey—one of the principal leaders of ideological reaction, and the head of the so-called Chicago school. Dewey merely supplied pragmatism with a new name, "instrumentalism," which did not in the least change the heart of the matter, but provided Dewey with renown as an inventor of a new "ism." John Dewey has, perhaps, done a special service to the imperialists in that he energetically strives to adapt pragmatism to serve the political aims of the reactionary American bourgeoisie.

John Dewey designates his theory "instrumentalism" because, according to his agnostic views, no theory gives men knowledge of objective reality, being only a conventional method, an instrument.

This point of view corresponds with the assertion of William James that scientific thought is not a reflection of existence, but a conventional

process, a working hypothesis, a guide necessary for the coordination of new experience with old convictions. And, like James, Dewey understands experience in a subjective-idealist sense.

Logical work, the imperialists are taught by their flunkey, John Dewey, begins every time in the midst of already existing activity at the moment when the latter encounters obstacles to its customary development, when there arise conflicts between different factors and it is necessary to restore the disturbed harmony.

The process of thinking, according to the "instrumental" logic of Dewey, consists of an effort to end "disorder."

This little idea of instrumentalism, which regards harmony as the overcoming of conflict, is nothing but an effort to revive the reactionary assertion of Hegelian idealist dialectics concerning the reconciliation of contradictions and to lay it, in a modified form, at the basis of bourgeois social theory. Just as in his logic Dewey speaks about the reconciliation of conflicts of thought, so in his sociology he speaks of the reconciliation of the class contradictions of capitalist society.

Dewey's "instrumental" conception of ethics and sociology corresponds to his "instrumental" conception of logic. His reactionary philosophy is combined with a reactionary theory of social life. Dewey maintains that behavior arises from the active contacts of human beings with others, as a result of their mutually affecting activities in the realm of desire, belief, judgment, etc., i.e., as a result of the interaction of purely psychic activities.

This pragmatic characterization of social life, which has nothing in common with a scientific conception, ignores actual objective laws of social development. Its significance resides in its presentation of the class struggle, which has a material basis, as an outcome of the conflict of different thoughts, views, "psychic activities."

It is here that the "practical philosophy" of instrumentalism comes to the fore, with its call to active effort on the part of the ruling reactionary bourgeoisie towards the "establishment of harmony" between the exploiters and the exploited, by means of psychological influence upon the consciousness of the masses with the aid of "psychological sociology."

Dewey explains to the capitalists that present times are not those of the Middle Ages, with settled habitual views and norms, that the present age is an age of mobility and dynamism, and that it is necessary to act.

In former times, teaches Dewey, things were relatively so stable that there was justification for compliance with them, and there could exist goals and ideals that were as static and fixed as the existing conditions.

Today, on the other hand, there are no sufficiently firm stabilizing norms that we might submit to; neither is there any material on the basis of which it might be possible to set up ultimate and all-embracing goals. On the other hand, there is an excessively constant flux. Under such conditions, Dewey enlightens his imperialist masters, established and all-embracing goals are only dreams; conflicts find their way into society, and a contemplative attitude towards them is not politics, but a repudiation of politics.

But wherein must the active politics of the ruling classes be manifested? It is necessary, says Dewey, to develop methods of reorganizing society, and

here the psychology of human behavior must be brought to bear.

As a philosophic method of "understanding and curing social ills," Dewey proposes the "instrumental method" of reconciling contradictions. In its application to psychology, this general thesis means that psychology, studying the behavior of people, seeks to find in all psychic processes a combination of impulse and habit, progress and tradition. In accordance with this, pedagogy, called in to exert an influence upon the psyche, must strive to reconcile in the psyche "the habit" with "the impulse," the old with the new. In this connection, Dewey ascribes an especially important role to influencing the child's plastic psyche in such a way that, from the earliest year, ideas of irreconcilable social contradictions are not permitted to penetrate into the consciousness.

Dewey preaches a theory, advantageous to American imperialists and harmful to the interests of the American working class, that the struggle of the workers against capitalists is not a necessity, but is deliberately fanned. As a faithful lackey of the imperialist bourgeoisie, Dewey declares the struggle of American workers against capitalists to be anti-social, and endeavors to corrupt the mind of the workers by the illusion of so-called meliorism—"the amelioration" of the capitalist order on the basis of the inviolability of the foundations of capitalism.

Social life, repeats Dewey over and over again, must be reconstructed in a manner that would prevent the manifestation of "blind emotion and rude force." (In the terminology of the bourgeois apologist, these words imply a revolutionary change in social relations.)

Dewey's main task, as he sees it, is to cover up, to minimize the class contradictions of contemporary capitalist society. Instrumental philosophy and sociology strive to provide the imperialist bourgeoisie with means and methods of suppressing the class consciousness of the workers. This is the meaning and the purpose of instrumentalism.

In recent years Dewey has slipped down to the positions of darkest reaction. In his last book, *Problems of Man,* he develops the reactionary idea of the necessity of strengthening the American imperialist state for "control over society," for "struggle against social chaos," for "conquest of world conflict." The reactionary and nonsensical ideology of American world hegemony has found in John Dewey its spokesman and apologist. Like Hegel, Nietzsche and the German fascists, Dewey declares that "warlikeness," as well as the desire for private property, is "a component part of human nature."

Supporting and providing moral "rationalization" for the world expansion of American imperialism, aiding in the suppression of the labor movement in the United States, Dewey has revealed beyond all doubt the anti-popular, reactionary character of his philosophy. A bitter opponent of Marxism, John Dewey has now turned into a vicious enemy of the Soviet Union and joined hands with the Trotskyite agent, Sidney Hook. On his part, Sidney Hook, this latest offspring of American pragmatism who calls his eclectic hash a "philosophy of experimental naturalism," is engaged, in the interest of deceiving the masses, in a monstrous effort to bring together the philosophy of instrumentalism and Marxism, producing an unheard-of

distortion of Marxism, its "modification" on a pragmatic basis.

The philosophy of pragmatism is a philosophy of active service to American reaction. Preaching the idea of "harmony" between the exploiters and the exploited, bedeviling the consciousness of the masses with a business psychology, paving the way for clericalism, reactionary pragmatism strives to penetrate among the working masses in order to corrupt them spiritually and subject them to the influence of bourgeois ideology. Pragmatism is the most vicious enemy of the American laboring masses, and the most determined struggle must be waged against it.

III

The next, quite fashionable trend in American bourgeois philosophy is the so-called neo-realism. This designation must not deceive us concerning the meaning of neo-realism, since the very word "realism" is understood in this philosophy not in the sense of recognition of the reality of the objective world, but in the sense of a contraposition of the object and the subject within consciousness.

But what is American neo-realism?[2] It is characterized by its close ideological kinship with the reactionary idealist teaching of Machism and its affinity with pragmatism. But while pragmatists place experience on the first plane, the neo-realists stress the question of the object and the relation between the perceiving subject and the perceived object. However, despite this difference in the centers of attention in the theory of cognition of the pragmatists and neo-realists, despite this difference in their postulation of philosophic problems, they meet in one question of principle, not to mention other, less important ones,—both are reactionary idealists, closely approaching the position of Ernst Mach.

Eclecticism, and the invalidity of the neo-realist theory of cognition are manifested most clearly in its assertion that the object is inseparable from consciousness, that it always exists in conjunction with it, yet at the same time, while it is immanent in consciousness, the object is also independent of consciousness.

How, then, do the neo-realists distinguish themselves from Machists? The neo-realists say that they attribute great importance to logical categories, while the Machists do not. The neo-realists reproach Machism for "naturalistic prejudice"; Mach's teaching seems to them excessively naturalistic in its tendencies.

The neo-realists see the defect of Machism in its disregard of the logical aspect of knowledge, in its choice of sensations as the sole "elements," while, from the point of view of neo-realists, physical and psychic complexes include not only sensational properties, but also more fundamental, formal relations, such as order, causality, time, etc., which must be the object of special study.

Correspondingly, neo-realism proposes two theses: the first states that in principle there is no distinction between the spirit and the body in the sense of their sensual properties, or, to put it differently, both the spirit and

[2] Mr. Dynnik is here referring to *The New Realism,* a volume of essays by Ralph Barton Perry, E. B. Holt, W. T. Marvin, William P. Montague, E. G. Spaulding and W. B. Pitkin.—S. H.

the body are represented as complexes of sensations; the second thesis of neo-realism states that there is, in principle, no distinction between the spirit and the body from the point of view of logic, from the point of view of more basic, formal relations, which are common to them.

In view of the indicated difference between neo-realism and Machism, the former introduces in place of the Machist word "element" a new word, "term," so that the spirit and the body are regarded by the neo-realists as "complexes of terms."

IV

As for the fourth school named above—the so-called critical realism—it is the most confused of all trends in contemporary American philosophy.[3]

The characteristic feature of critical realism manifests itself in its tendency to restore and modernize the idealism of Plato and the medieval Platonists.

George Santayana is the most reactionary of critical realists, and today is one of the zealous propagandists of Churchill's reactionary plan for Anglo-American domination of the world. In Santayana's interpretation, critical realism has become the ideology of the rankest Anglo-American reaction and the imperialist expansion of the United States.

The reactionary philosophical tendencies of American critical realism are clearly expressed by James Pratt. In his interpretation of critical realism Pratt has brought it close to personalism and named his viewpoint "personalist realism."

V

Study of the basic trends of contemporary American bourgeois philosophy shows that, from the point of view of their closest affinity, they are a continuation of Machism and empiriocriticism and other reactionary Western European doctrines. The representatives of the trends of pragmatism, neo-realism, and critical realism, which we reviewed above, are the descendants of Mach, Avenarius and other bourgeois fideists, whose philosophy was so masterfully exposed by Lenin in his famous book, *Materialism and Empirio-criticism.*

Drawing aside the curtain of the future in the evolution of empiriocriticism, Lenin especially stressed its deeply reactionary tendencies in the United States. Lenin's attention was attracted by the American philosopher Carus, who called himself "an admirer and personal friend" of Mach. Unmasking this standard-bearer of Machism and empirio-criticism in America, Lenin pointed out that in the person of this youngest offspring of Machism, "we see the leader of a company of American literary adventurers," whose task it is to drug the people with the poison of clerical obscurantism, to criminally corrupt the consciousness of the masses in order to make them the obedient slaves of American imperialism.

Lenin's prediction has been fully borne out. Contemporary bourgeois

[3]Critical realism as a movement in American philosophic thought found its first systematic expansion in a volume of essays entitled *Critical Realism* by Arthur O. Lovejoy, G. Santayana, Roy Wood Sellars, A. K. Rogers, C. A. Strong, D. Drake, J. B. Pratt. — S. H.

philosophers in America, whose closest spiritual forebears are Mach, Avenarius, and other bourgeois fideists, represent the reactionary refuse which serves to fertilize the ideological soil of the imperialist bourgeoisie. The carriers of this spiritual poison, especially such men as Dewey, Santayana and similar enemies of the people, fulfill the role of the philosophic flunkeys of the rankest imperialist reaction.

In characterizing the present condition of American bourgeois philosophy, we must also note the fact that in recent years the reactionary ideas of German idealist philosophy are again becoming widely current in the United States.

Contemporary neo-scholastics, those dark descendants of the medieval theology of Thomas Aquinas, have firmly entrenched themselves in the United States, where the reactionary philosophy of the French existentialist, J. P. Sartre, and the no less reactionary philosophy of the Italian philosopher, Benedetto Croce, are also favored and patronized.

Such are the facts which characterize the international reactionary role of American philosophy, connected with the present-day post-war role of the United States as the principal center of international reactionary ideology.

[Translated by MIRRA GINSBURG]

WELL, ANYWAY, NO ONE SAID THEY WERE UP IN A BALLOON

We asked 50 people chosen at random throughout New York the following question: Where are the United Nations headquarters?

Here are some typical answers:

Tailor: "At the old World's Fair grounds." (Flushing gets a majority of the votes.)

Hairdresser: "Paris."

University of Pennsylvania Freshman: "Dumbarton Oaks."

Polish Housekeeper: "Somewhere on the water—I once read the name."

Bostonian: "At the St. Francis Hotel, San Francisco."

Manicurist: "Moscow—twice a year."

Spanish Teacher: "Casablanca."

Young Lawyer: "I thought it was all vetoed."

Grocery Clerk: "Eh—d'you mean the American or the Russian one?"

School Girl: "Well, lots of places, of course . . ."

Butler: "Westbury."

Electrician: "Who cares?"

Exterminator: "Lake Success."

Flushed with success, at last, we discontinued our polling.—*United Nations World.*

ON THE IMAGE OF AMERICA IN EUROPEAN LITERATURE

Erich Franzen

About thirty years ago, the Danish novelist Jóhannes V. Jensen stated that each time mankind returned to earth from a flight into the realm of lofty ideas and started searching for food, America was rediscovered. The quotation does not seem untimely today; nor is the remark at variance with historical facts. However, his "naturalism" prevented Jensen from seeing that man can very well concern himself with lofty ideas while at the same time pursuing his material well-being. When Columbus set sail for the dreamland of Plato, Seneca, and the medieval scholars, he had his mind on giving a concrete meaning to the old fantasies. Yet, the belief in the spiritual concept of the "Islands of the Paradise" proved to be a powerful stimulus to him and his followers. It seems that man, when striving for worldly happiness, always needs a guiding image which he gains from an ideal pattern of orientation. Such images, of course, are closely related to an ever changing reality, and therefore never remain static. They have a history of their own, though ever reflecting the actual conditions from which they have emerged.

It is possible, then, to learn much about European social history from the changes which occurred in the concept of America since the discovery of this continent. Naturally, one must be prepared to find that even representative authors, belonging to the same period, often express widely divergent opinions on the subject. One is, indeed, surprised by the seemingly arbitrary manner in which European writers have selected one or another aspect of American life as their focus of interest, and by the alternation of highly positive and wholly negative reactions. It would not help much if one attempted to explain such frequent contradictions by the time-worn subjective method of resorting to the respective authors' "turns and twists of mind." Instead, it can be assumed that the different images created by European writers of a new and strange world perform a definite

ERICH FRANZEN was a noted literary critic and essayist in his native Germany and contributed regularly to the *Frankfurter Zeitung,* the *Literarische Welt* and the *Neue Rundschau.* In this country he has taught sociology at Miami University and the University of Illinois.

function within the intellectual, social, and political life of the old continent. Even the most factual reports are not based on sense impressions only, for they show what each writer wishes to observe or to leave unnoticed, and they thereby reveal his dependence on a definite social pattern accepted by him as his point of orientation. Thus, one gradually recognizes that even the most heterogeneous evaluations of America are closely related to dynamic and often antagonistic forces determining the destiny of Europe and of her peoples. To a large extent, then, the stand taken by each writer on vital issues of his own country influences the judgment of value which he projects on his concept of American reality.

For more than two centuries after the discovery of this continent, the early vision of a "Golden Age" in a "New Arcadia" on American soil underwent but little change. Of course, the Utopia so eagerly sought for never materialized; yet, for a long time the belief in the dreamed-of "Land of Promise" has been almost unshakeable. Even after the idealistic content of the "Arcadian" vision assumed a rather materialistic tinge, the strength of the enduring Utopian concept remained evident in both the trust put in boundless American prosperity and in the deep disappointment over the cleavage between early ideals and emerging American reality.

Closely associated with the mental image of a new Utopia was the belief in the rejuvenating force of Primitivism. Life in nature, it was hoped, would help throw off the burden of an inherited civilization which had become unmanageable and oppressive. In touch with the unspoiled soil, man himself would be reborn. He would develop all the virtues which one had come to attribute to the primitive creature called the "Noble Savage." The legend of the "Good Indian" served as the very foundation of European enthusiasm for America, and through a strange confusion the white American was generally considered as the direct heir of the "kind and innocent" former possessors of the soil. In the 18th century, the appreciation of the value of primitive life was fused with the love of liberty and the belief in man's natural rights, both of which everybody could enjoy in the "virgin" American country. In spite of many strong counter-currents, quite a few traces of the old conception have survived. Even today, European writers often are willing to put up with the disadvantage of "American primitivism," as they call it, in order to enjoy the freedom which it implies from institutional rule.

Thus, the concepts of the "Promised Land" and of the "Noble

Savage" furnished the basis for the attitude taken toward America by European writers.

With the approaching crisis of feudalism and with the dawning of the era of enlightenment, the image of America became more differentiated. Defenders and opponents of the old order used it for propaganda in favor of their respective cases. While the foxy Talleyrand expressed his deep disgust at "a detestable country where men are ready to sell their favorite dogs," and Corneille de Paw asserted, "men and animals alike degenerate on American soil," the foes of oppression identified everything American with liberty itself. Readers of the *Gazette de France* were informed in 1774 that "an innate taste for liberty is inseparable from the soil, the sky, the forests, and the lakes, which keeps this new country from resembling the other parts of the globe. Our navigators are persuaded that any European brought to those climes will contract that peculiar characteristic." Those fighting the Catholic church praised the Quakers as shining examples of religious liberty. Even a progressive *abbé,* Monsieur Raynal, indulged in profuse eulogies of their wisdom. Voltaire offered the most succinct formula when he blessed Benjamin Franklin's grandson with the words, "God and Liberty," and the great worshiper of reason, Robespierre, devoted his first public address to Franklin.

A similar clash of opinions occurred in England. To the adherents of Thomas Paine and William Pitt the Quakers appeared as "people whose arrogance sticks through their clothes" and Franklin as the personification of a new and threatening type, the "dull bourgeois." On the other hand, poets like Burns and Blake sided with the Americans in their fight for freedom, and so did most of the novelists who wrote for the middle-class. However, it is obvious that not all of them were moved by lofty humanitarian ideals which they expected to materialize in America. The middle-class people were in favor of liberty, but by a natural confusion they considered "free trade for all" as about the same thing. To them, America appeared as the country of abundant resources, the "Land of Promise" for merchants and speculators. A new appraisal of values peculiar to the "home of liberty" was made, and the color of the image of America changed from white to gold. Already the high-minded Abbé Raynal, defending the concept of a simple Arcadia, felt it necessary to issue this warning to all Americans: "May the example of nations that have preceded you, especially that of your mother-country, teach you: beware of the affluence of gold!"

Once the French and American revolutions had succeeded, the material prospects resulting from the newly-won freedom overshadowed the ideological meaning of liberty. As if in reply to Abbé Raynal's exhortation, General Steuben wrote from America: "Two years of work can make a man successful. What a beautiful country this is! Here everybody is prosperous." The great German poet Goethe was just as realistic as Steuben. His words, "America, you are better off. If I were twenty years younger, I should emigrate to America," are significant of the shift of emphasis which had taken place during those very twenty years. To the young Goethe, as to his friends Herder, Klinger, Wieland, and many others, America had been an abstract symbol of their fight for a better world; now, it became a concrete chance for everybody. Goethe exhorted young Europeans to take that chance and prove their worth. In his novel *Wilhelm Meister* he set before them the example of Benjamin Franklin and William Penn, after whose image some of the main characters are molded. Goethe thought highly of Robert Owen's "New Harmony" enterprise, because he deemed it the right place to show industriousness, communal spirit, and all the other virtues by which the new bourgeois society ought to distinguish itself from the parasitic feudal order.

Evidently, the old Utopian concept came to life again in the optimistic expectation entertained by many during the early adventurous stage of capitalism. It is not without meaning that one hundred years after Goethe precisely the same virtues for which he praised the spirit of Americans are exalted by Knut Hamsun for the opposite reason. The lure of a "New World" now is considered a dangerous temptation for the young Norwegian peasant. Goethe's bourgeois adventurer has turned into the decadent character of a rootless man. Industriousness and social responsibility are no longer associated with an enterprising spirit attempting to build a new world. Capitalism has come of age. The moral qualities regarded as essential by both Goethe and Hamsun are identical, but their detachment from the meaning they had in the day of Goethe has altered the whole context of which they are a part. The projection of this change on the concept of America accounts for the difference between the attitudes of Goethe and of Hamsun.

After Robert Owen's Utopian colony and similar attempts by other social reformers collapsed, the vision of the "Land of Promise" became more and more identical with a speculative faith put in an economic system of free enterprise and laissez-faire. European writers

watched the development of industrial capitalism with growing concern. Freed from medieval chains, reason itself had become an absolute ruler. Economic rationality, void of any humanitarian content, lost all regard for either man or nature. As the impact on their old civilization of industrial capitalism was increasingly resented by Europeans, the image of America (where, after all, no such holy traditions were threatened) was made to reflect their deep disappointment over conditions at home. When the first chimneys were erected in Fuerth, a suburb of Nuremberg, and rose over the beautiful medieval spires of that city, the poet Ludwig Tieck felt justified in comparing Fuerth to "all of North America." Altogether, European romanticists exhibited a strong nostalgia for the lost values of their well integrated medieval culture. The contrast between the two eras, appalling as it must be even to Europeans of today, is not felt in America, which had no Middle Ages. Therefore, the disgust European writers have often expressed at the lack of style, the ugliness, and the vulgarity of the industrial scene in the new world seem disproportionate, arbitrary, and even crazy to Americans. However, the more the discrepancy between the symbols and values of those two periods of their history was resented by Europeans, the darker the colors of the once golden image of America became. If European writers hated the expansion in their own country of the materialistic spirit, they hated it even more in America, the early "hope of mankind."

Already in Jonathan Swift's *A Modest Proposal* a trace of this point of view can be found. When making a bitterly scornful suggestion that the poor in Ireland should slaughter their own children, Swift remarks: "I have been assured by a very knowing American that a young, healthy child, well-nursed, is, at a year old, a most delicious, nourishing, and wholesome food." The poker-faced recklessness of American businessmen to which this remark alludes, often recurs as the main target of European critics of later periods. In 1855, the German Kuernberger wrote: "The most obnoxious thing about American people is that their minds remain stolid and unmoved, whether they go to commit murder or just to do business." The Hungarian born poet Lenau who came to America with the intention "to smoke, hunt, and make fun of the apes in the woods," returned home in utter distress, remarking that on this continent "man has developed into a practical type of the most horrifying dryness and emptiness." And what could be more revealing of the piercing doubt which had sneaked into the hearts of even the most

illustrious fighters for freedom and progress than Heine's terse description of America as "a gigantic prison where one is chained to liberty"? What more desperate than Dickens' complaint (almost a literal reversal of the enthusiastic words printed by the *Gazette de France* in 1774): "The earth, the air, the vegetation, and the water that they drank, all teemed with deadly properties"? What more loaded with metaphysical forebodings than Baudelaire's condemnation of progress in America: "Those newcomers to history are convinced that industry, in whose unlimited power they naively put their faith, will finally consume the devil"? The devil—even the medieval Utopists had never thought of him. In their dream of a New Arcadia there had been no place for the devil, although he had seemed ever present and quite real in Europe itself. Only now, after human endeavor had made an actuality out of the "Land of Promise," the eternal destroyer of man's hope cast an infernal shadow over the glowing picture, claiming his part in the image of America. It is perhaps within this context that Sigmund Freud's gloomy diagnosis, "America—a miscarriage," can be best understood.

The strongest rejection of the entire trend of thought which, based on a wrong conception of happiness, resulted in the transmogrification of the sublime Utopian ideal into a real Eldorado for golddiggers, came from the borders of Asia. In his novel *The Brothers Karamasoff,* Dostoevski confronts the hero Dmitri with the necessity of a choice between the Land of Promise and the Land of Sufferings. Dmitri is threatened with deportation, but is given the opportunity to flee to America. He chooses Siberia. Man can grow only through suffering. America "would be the same all over again." What can anybody gain by going there and enjoying the accomplishments of technical progress? "They would fix you a new wart on your cheek, those d— engineers." In Dostoevski's opinion, then, it is better to carry one's cross in this world than to be bothered with the nuisance of an artificial wart on one's face, and be it an "Utopian" growth.

As compared with Dostoevski's radical condemnation of the American "promise," the dissatisfaction which other modern writers express over one or another feature of American life seems trifling and shallow. Some European critics of the American scene are annoyed by the amount of standardization of life in industrialized society, others dislike the lack of appreciation of art and scholarship, plus the overvaluation of money, while others again ridicule the relationship between the sexes in Yankeeland. But none of them

questions the fundamentals of western civilization in general, as Dostoevski did, and therefore even their bitterest denunciation in the last analysis can be reduced to a matter of taste versus taste.

Only in one novel, in Louis Ferdinand Céline's *Journey to the End of the Night,* the image of America is made the symbol of a total destruction of values. Céline is an extreme nihilist, weary and tired of the artificiality of civilization, like his romantic predecessor Chateaubriand. However, when Chateaubriand crossed the ocean in 1825 and roamed through "woods which had never felt the axe," where he could "fully experience our nothingness by reflecting the melancholy and sadness of nature," he at least carried in his mind the glowing image of an unspoiled country with mighty streams and primeval forests. "I went from tree to tree," he reported, "saying to myself, 'here are no more roads, or cities, or presidents, or kings, or *men*'." That peculiarly French variety of nihilistic individualism reappears as an essential element of Céline's work. But in Céline's nightmarish projection of his desire for nothingness even nature is disenchanted. Chateaubriand's woods offer no comfort any more to lost souls; the woods are owned by Ford, and Ford is hell. However, with all of that, America is not much different from Europe. To the nihilist it is not a question of choice, because his only choice is between life and death. From that point of view, America to Céline means the epitomy of a senseless life in the most modern fashion.

In that respect, and in that respect only, Céline's concept of America lends itself to a dialectic comparison with Franz Kafka's grandiose vision of the real "meaning" of life in the new world. In Kafka's novel *America,* the hero is a European adolescent who innocently becomes entangled in an adventure with a wily and sensual maid. As customary in Europe in former times, his parents send the young "sinner" to America to start a new life. He has to find his way alone, and it leads him through a maze of inextricably complicated, bizarre, and oddly inescapable situations. Everything seems to be a matter of chance; nothing, neither the attitude of the people nor the possible course of events, can be calculated in advance. Lost in this bewildering world which does not seem to make sense, the boy gradually finds his own self. That, perhaps, is the only meaning life has: that it offers one a chance to grow up in spite of guilt, confusion, and seemingly senseless experiences. Thus, America in this novel becomes a general symbol of reality in our time. The new import Kafka thereby gives to the old Utopian image makes Dmitri Karamasoff's choice of Siberia look like an escape from the challenges of life.

Reality today, however, means a world in disorder and a society in transition. Since Kafka wrote his book, Europe has suffered a tragic fate. Her cultural values are threatened with disintegration. More than ever European writers feel called upon to defend their heritage against the lure and the impact of the New World. With their most cherished traditions endangered by an inevitable standardization of social and individual life, they project precisely their fear of such a development on America, blaming her for her lack of tradition and her all too rational spirit. W. H. Auden calls the American community the first egalitarian and untraditional society and adds, "What in fact is missing in America, what has been consciously rejected . . . is the *romanitas* upon which Europe was founded and which she has not ceased attempting to preserve. . . The mediocre American is possessed by the present, and the mediocre European is possessed by the past. To overcome mediocrity, the American must make the present *his* present, and the European the past *his* past." André Siegfried, while concerned with the same problem, arrives at just the opposite conclusion. "The American community," he says, "is closer to the ancient civilization in which the individual belonged to the city state than the social fabric of Western Europe which has evolved from the Middle Ages and the French Revolution. . . In America collectivism is subtly undermining the liberty of the individual, and he himself assents to his own abnegation." The spectre of a rational life which is not constantly threatened by disaster, is particularly disturbing to European existentialists. American people, according to Jean-Paul Sartre, are suffering "from an obscure malady which has no name. They are tragic people because of the total absence of any tragic element within themselves and in their surroundings." It seems clear from such and similar remarks by representative writers and philosophers that Europe is ready to take up the old argument advanced by Dostoevski. Whenever reality becomes unbearable, and unmanageable by reason, the irrational value of suffering comes in for its share of praise. That might explain why modern European authors, when writing about America, resort to a trend of thought which originated in Czarist Russia in 1888. Yet, behind the combination of old and new ideologies constantly reshuffled in a manner to fit the conditions and trends prevailing in Europe, one can discern the contours of a multifaceted but historically coherent image of a strange "New World."

APOSTLES OF UNREASON

Jim Cork

We are not in the shadow of death. We are rather at the focal point where . . . (we have) . . . disregarded or destroyed . . . (our) . . . heritage. We have nothing left but our intelligence and energy . . . Once again we stand ready to draw man up from the depths of defeat.

—Andre Malraux.

The problem for our distraught age, as Malraux has put it, is on what basis to recreate man. To judge by the answers given by various learned representatives of our culture, our epoch is likely to go down in history as the age of escape from reason. For a welter of irrationalisms abound on all sides—in the arts (where their play in reflecting the complex, dark personality of man is, at least, legitimate); in philosophy; among the scientists; and among those who concern themselves with the problem of social change.

Science, the proudest creation of human reasoning, is especially suspect, viewed almost as a pariah by the protagonists of the irrational, its activities condemned, its rationale questioned, its possible application to the solution of the pressing problems of man in society disputed. Its critical but painstakingly slow technique of discovering new knowledge is cast aside in favor of an easier and more wholesale method of arriving at unquestioned, absolute truth, unquestioned and absolute because the results of the new technique of observation (inner intuition) are not, by their very nature, subject to public scrutiny nor in need of objective verification.

History points to the fact that proliferations of irrationalisms have inevitably been the idealogical concomitants of societies in agony. That our epoch is such a one need not be argued. The depth of the social crisis, the horrors of the last war, the magnitude of human suffering, the ever-present, awesome threat of the atom bomb, the acute, seemingly unresolvable antagonisms existing in our world (America vs. Russia, West vs. East, White vs. Black, Arab vs. Jew, Hindu vs. Moslem, etc.), all combine to make man

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JIM CORK is an American free-lance writer who contributed a "Portrait of Nehru" to our April issue and the "Portrait of Einstein," *Modern Review,* August 1947.

fearful and uncertain of his destiny. His sense of frustration, of personal alienation in a mad, strange world, increases immeasurably.

The steady, if slow eradication of such social fears, anxieties, neuroses, would, by virtue of the same fact, seem to be integrally connected with the problem of building a decent, sane, civilized, humanistic society, though that would, obviously, not solve all problems of personal happiness on earth. But, curiously enough, as we shall see later, our new vendors of irrationalism, who would minister to man's sick soul, are, relatively, little concerned with such mundane problems of history and time as building a decent society on earth. Their ecstatic visions are turned elsewhere, and instead of showing to poor lost souls how concrete evils on earth can be eliminated, are busy demonstrating that these evils must exist, because they reflect the ineradicable evil in man himself; that he is powerless to remove them; that his will, courage, intelligence, all count for naught; that he should cast himself upon the mercy of an inscrutible supernatural force and ask for grace and forgiveness.

This enduring obsession with the "eternal," which really covers an escape from handling the real and pressing problems of contemporary man, finds its clearest, most uncompromising (and obscurantist) expression in the various religious schools of the day. It is the purpose of this article to submit to a concrete criticism some of the ideas of the leading apostles of the New Evangelism in our contemporary world (Maritain, Berdyaev, Barth, Niebuhr). It is obvious that within the short space of one article the treatment can only be suggestive, not exhaustive.

I do not intend on this occasion to engage in abstract and abstruse philosophical tilting with the major metaphysical positions of the religionists, though that also has to be done, and has been effectively done by the defenders of a naturalist-humanist position.[1] Rather am I interested, for the moment, in the more modest (but for readers of this magazine more immediately relevant) problem of testing the attitudes of our revivalists towards those basic values which, in my opinion, underly the good society; viz: freedom of enquiry in the search for new knowledge (scientific method), tolerance, simple humanism, democracy, etc. Let me state my conclusion dogmatically in advance: the supernaturalist viewpoint, which is the heart of the doctrines of all the religionists, is repugnant equally to scientific naturalism, secular humanism and democratic values.

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[1]See in this connection *Naturalism and the Human Spirit*. Edited by Yervant H. Krikorian. Columbia University Press, 1944.

Kierkegaard

It would be of service, by way of introduction, to cast a glance in the direction of Kierkegaard, whose shadow stalks a good deal of modern religious and philosophical writing. The rediscovery, after a century of shrouded obscurity, of this crabbed and tortured local philosopher-theologian is, in itself, a minor miracle of idealogical resuscitation, explainable only on the basis that he mirrors so starkly the uncertainties, anxieties, fears and terrors driving modern alienated man. The theologians especially have seized upon Kierkegaard because his thought exhibits all the threads which they have so lovingly tied together to form the total obscurantist pattern: the decrial of science; the emphasis upon intuition as the road to *real* knowledge; the insistence upon faith; the surrender to supernaturalism; the minimization of earthly joys; the critique of democracy. The adoption, as it were, by modern theologians, of the man denoted by Niebuhr as ". . . the profoundest interpreter of the psychology of the religious life . . . since St. Augustine" is doubly significant in view of the fact that Kierkegaard was in no sense an orthodox Christian but a virulent critic of the institutionalized church of his day.

Kierkegaard's writings were feverishly devoted to establishing a direct communication between himself and God. All obstacles, whether proposed intermediaries like the church or elaborate theological edifices purporting to establish the objective truths of Christendom, or the exact relationship of man to God, or the goodness of God, etc., were impatiently brushed aside. The thing that was necessary to solve was the riddle of one's own path to faith: ". . . the thing to do is to find a truth which is true *for me* . . . to find *the idea for which I can live and die*" (K's emphasis).[2] There is no objective truth for all. "Truth is subjectivity," Kierkegaard proclaimed. So the emphasis upon the subjective, the insulated "I," the individual who is the only real existent, the importance of his existence as inwardness, which has inspired all Existentialists. And so, also, the rejection of general objective knowledge in favor of "essential knowledge" (the immediately graspable) and the ways and means of arriving at it (inner intuition and faith): " . . . immediacy is reality . . . consciousness is contradiction . . . Knowledge and faith are polar opposites . . . Knowledge is a grasp of the possible and not a realization of the actual . . . "[3] In the *Journals,* Kierkegaard speaks of

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[2] "The Journals"—p. 5, from *A Kierkegaard Anthology.* Edited by Robert Bretall. All quotations hereafter from this book unless otherwise indicated.

[3] *Ibid.* See introduction.

using the understanding in order to believe against the understanding. His denial of science and all its objective, truth-seeking rationale, follows logically, of course, after that: "In our time it is especially the natural sciences that are dangerous . . ." (*Papers*).

There is a passage in Barret's pamphlet, *What is Existentialism,* which states: "Passing over the issue of Christianity, we can isolate from Kierkegaard's attack (vs. Hegel's blasphemous assumption of knowledge of God's intentions—J. C.) the simple point of human *truthfulness* (B's emphasis), the will to remain faithful to human experience itself" (p. 22). This is a curiously opaque judgment to hold of an impossibly stoical and austere doctrine which denounces man's efforts to help himself as futile (except in the one case of finding the private stairway to heaven), which disdains those simple earthly joys which are the mark of man's human essence (friendship, love, marriage, family, etc.), and extends the excommunication even to aesthetic experiences and artistic creation (notwithstanding his famous soliloquy on Mozart's *Don Giovanni*). Kierkegaard says, "One must guard against friendship . . . it is impossible for one human being to be anything to another human being except to be in his way . . . friendship is dangerous, marriage still more so; for woman is and ever will be the ruin of man as soon as he contracts a permanent relation with her . . . When two beings fall in love with one another and begin to suspect that they were made for each other, it is time to have the courage to break it off . . . One must never enter into the relation of marriage . . . When you are one of several you have lost your freedom . . ."[4] Indulgence in earthly pleasures will distort a man's character, maim his essence, and prevent him from coming before his Lord on the awesome day of judgment with the requisite purity. If ever a man literally talked himself out of life's complete content, it was Kierkegaard with this misanthropy of majestic proportions.

Kierkegaard's insistence upon the inviolability of the inward life of the individual, the absolute isolation of the "I", precluded his having any sympathy with the idea of a human community, for community means extension outward and a denial of the inward self which is the only true guarantor of the freedom of the individual. As a recent critic of Kierkegaard has said, "To focus only on one's self in total isolation is to take an impossible view of human nature . . . morality is meaningless without some conception of a community in which the individual is set."[5]

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[4]*Either/Or*—p. 28, 29, 30.

[5]Marjorie Grene—"Kierkegaard" in *Kenyon Review,* Winter, 1947.

Such views on the horrendous impingement of community living on the necessary isolation of the "I" inevitably entailed also political and social isolation and so Kierkegaard, quite logically, criticized any movement (like socialism) which dreamt of a more just community on earth: ". . . the idea of socialism and community cannot save this age . . . Socialism is just one among many attempts to degrade individuals by equalizing all so as to remove all organic, concrete differentiations and distinctions . . ."[6] As to democracy generally, Kierkegaard expressed his distaste in no uncertain terms against the tendency of his age towards equality and the levelling process as endangering the precious core of individualism in Everyman.[7]

Faith, Reason and Knowledge

"Cursed be the man that trusteth in man, even if it be intelligent man, or, perhaps, particularly if he be intelligent man," says Niebuhr.[8] Kierkegaard has found himself a worthy descendent. This distrust of man's intelligence and all its presumed devilish offspring runs like a red thread through all the writings of our leading contemporary evangelists. Its logical counterpart, again echoing Kierkegaard, is the insistence upon a "realer" reality than mere knowledge, one accessible only to intuition and faith. Upon this "firm" prop, our religionists pyramid all their subsequent dazzling generalizations. For Maritain, ". . . it is not possible to escape from the results of the irruption of faith into the structures of our knowledge . . . knowledge is . . . in opposition to the highest regions of our understanding."[9] He builds a hierarchical structure of intellectual pursuits, and it will surprise nobody to find science on the lowliest rung whereas pure wisdom (through revelation, of course) graces the dizzy apex. That is why medieval society, in spite of its material wretchedness and intellectual ignorance, facts which Maritain blithely admits, is placed by him at the very pinnacle of successful types of society because "it knew of this order of wisdom."

Berdyaev, father of "Personalism," also appreciates his Kierkegaard, and places him with those (Tolstoy, Dostoevski, Leon Bloy, etc.) who, to him, typified the defense of the spiritual life against the crass materialism of the nineteenth century. He was

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[6]From *Reason and Revolution* by Marcuse—p. 266.
[7]See "The Present Age"—p. 260 of the *Kierkegaard Anthology.*
[8]*Beyond Tragedy*—p. 125.
[9]See p. 4 and p. 109 of Maritain's *Science and Wisdom.*

especially delighted to find in Kierkegaard a pied-piper who could lead him beyond the paltry demands of real life, teach him how to transcend mere earthly limitations: "The spiritual life is an escape from social life . . . the spiritual path leads away from the finite world."[10] (what a safe haven is the infinite), and, above all, to keep spirit free from any earthly contamination: "The whole experience of humanity testifies to the reality of spirit . . . the reality of spirit is quite different from that of the natural world. This reality is not demonstrated, but is revealed by those able to distinguish qualities. The reality of spirit is independent of the categories of thought . . . it is independent of natural reflection and perception, and in this way has an affinity with magic freedom."[11]

Magis *is* freedom. Poor science which hasn't the freedom to use magic, but must face facts and submit its findings to experiential proof. Not that it isn't urged to use magic by Niebuhr who would purify its methodology and thereby make of it a better science: "Science, which is only science, cannot be scientifically accurate." A very engaging formula, indeed. The obscurantist purpose is rather obvious, to press for admission as canons of evidence the claims of intuitive and religio-mystic feelings. Were such status granted them, the results, of course, could only be disastrous for the method of objective analysis in any realm. It would make, as Sidney Hook wittily says, our viscera an organ of knowledge. If every subjective hallucination was granted full rights as witness in scientific court, how distinguish between a scientist and a madman, or, for that matter, between a madman and a saint?

Original Sin

Of all the doctrines held by the religionist, surely the most morally reprehensible to a humanist is the doctrine of original sin. Pressed equally by Catholic and Protestant theologians, it weighs like an alp upon the consciences and wills of the overwhelming majority of Christian communicants. Even liberals in the ranks of the Protestants (Niebuhr) have succumbed to its dark absolutism. Old Calvin, even after 400 years, still has his hooks in them. Karl Barth, for instance, has sweepingly rejected the claims of any sort of natural religion. He has insisted that man is dependent upon the mercy of a God who can be known only through His supernaturalist revelation, which is to be found in His word transmitted through the Bible. Niebuhr, who has found the unrelieved Calvin-

[10] *Spirit and Reality* by Berdyaev. p. 121.
[11] *Ibid.* pp. 31 and 122.

ism of Barth distasteful on occasion, nevertheless, in this matter follows the European neo-Calvinist rather closely, and is, if anything, even more virulent on the subject. For him, "the whole of human history is involved in guilt . . . The good news of the gospel is not (!) the law that we ought to love one another, the good news is that there is a source of divine mercy which is able to overcome a contradiction in our souls which we cannot ourselves overcome."[12]

Aside from the blithe assumption of the eternal unchangeability of human nature (which is absolutely refuted by the evidence presented by the social sciences), what shall we say of this theological doctrine which calls its adherents to an unreasoned and unconditional surrender to the will of a diety who is utterly unknown but who dictates every thought of the individual; of a doctrine in which human beings are regarded as totally and eternally depraved, and who can be released therefrom only through the grace of God? Men are utterly powerless to help themselves in the matter: "No society and no individual can ever escape the vicious circle of the sin which aggravates human insecurity by seeking to overcome it."[13] And man remains a sinner even after God's intervention: "Here human sin is overcome by divine mercy, though man remains a sinner."[14] What shall we say of it? Simply this, that no more horrendous moral doctrine is conceivable than this one which denies the power of social intelligence to refashion things on earth for the better, and insists on man remaining at the mercy of an inscrutible and not necessarily benevolent force.

Religion, Democracy and Tolerance

It is a favorite assertion of modern religious theoreticians, too frequently unchallenged, that democracy, both as idea and practice, had its origin in, and historically was bound up with Christianity. The claim is highly debatable, to say the least. Indeed, it would not be too much to say, that what extent of truth resides in the claim would be applicable almost exclusively only to those forces within historical Christendom that reacted critically towards accepted dogmas and prejudices, namely the heretical sects, the Anabaptists, the Levellers, the Diggers, etc. But they were the victims of intolerant treatment, driven out of the church, excommunicated, ex-

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[12] *Christianity and Power Politics*—p. 2.
[13] *Beyond Tragedy*, p. 108.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 62.

ecuted. The melancholy phenomenon was characteristic of both wings of Christendom.

There is an inherent tendency toward intolerance in religious belief firmly held. The true believer, who is sure that he has eternal truth in his grasp, seeks to proselytize. The official churches could not admit of error, and historically, whenever in state power or in a position to influence state action, sought to impose their religious will upon the believers. It was a rare religionist who pleaded for tolerance in religious beliefs, for that implied recognition of the fact that he might be in error. That is why religious toleration developed earlier and became more firmly imbedded in the cultural tradition of a country like America, which was relatively free of the intolerant religious heritage of Feudalism, was peopled by unpopular and unofficial European sects (which, however, soon developed an official intolerance of their own), was exposed to a multiplicity of types of religious belief, and in which a certain consequent loosening of religious ties subsequently developed. Niebuhr, who at least has a sense of historic fact superior to that of most religious writers, recognizes this fact: "It must be admitted that toleration in religion could probably not have been achieved in any modern democratic society had there not been a considerable decay of traditional religious loyalties."[15] There is an obvious moral hidden in this admission, but Niebuhr blinks it in passing.

If tolerance of belief, and of differences of opinion, and of the search for new truths is considered (as it should be) the heart of democratic doctrine, how substantiate this fantastic claim of Christian origins of democracy in the face of the bitter enmity of organized Christendom towards free and untrammeled enquiry, and its continuous persecution of its highest devotees, the Giordano Brunos, the Galileos, the Spinozas (the latter being subject also to the persecution of orthodox Judaism)? Indeed the extra-religious, secular origins of most of the tenets comprising the democratic faith is so apparent that even Maritain must give them credence: "Neither Locke nor Rousseau nor the Encyclopedists could pass for faithful believers . . . It was not the faithful believers in the Catholic dogma, it was the Rationalists who proclaimed in France the rights of man and citizen . . ."[16] This was, of course, no accident, but a development forced outside the church by those critical of the intolerance of its official dogmas. Nor was it accidental either that in

[15] *Children of Light and Children of Darkness,* p. 130.
[16] *Christianity and Democracy,* pp. 44-46.

America the highest pinnacle of religious tolerance was attained by a man like Jefferson, a Deist, who rejected all forms of supernaturalism, external revelation, and dogmatic mysteries, insisted that ethics were grounded in natural phenomena, and that man could find in nature the necessary guides to moral and religious living.

The long and melancholy story of intolerance, oppression and cruelty indulged in by the Catholic Church is well known to students of the subject, so well known, in fact, that even Catholic apologists like Maritain must take cognizance of it. But he has a very neat formula, indeed, for evading responsibility for all concretely reprehensible acts of the Church in the past (the neat formula holds just as well for the future). He merely makes a distinction between Catholics and *Catholicism,* between the abuses of persons functioning in time and the eternally pure and mysterious essence of the Church which remains uninvolved in and unaffected by such abuses: "Catholics are not Catholicism. The errors, apathies, shortcomings and slumbers of Catholics *do not involve Catholicism* . . . The church is a mystery, her head is hidden in the sky . . . if you seek to know what represents her, consider teh Pope and the episcopate teaching the faith and morals, consider the saints in Heaven and on earth, avert your eyes from us poor sinners . . ."[17] As if it were not the directives of the Pope and the episcopate (and the saints), teaching the faith and morals, which were responsible, for example, for the beauties of the Inquisition! But then the Church has been intolerant only of the intolerance of others and quite tolerant of her own, since her's, mind you, was engaged in saving man's immortal soul, which topped everything in the hierarchy of values. And as long as soul-saving is involved (and isn't it always) so long will Cardinal Newman's famous pronouncement ("She, the Church, regards the world and all that is in it, as dust and ashes, compared with the value of a single soul") provide the pragmatic sanction for intolerance.

Though claiming absolute obedience to the Church from democrats on the ground that democracy is impossible without a Christian basis, Maritain makes it quite clear, however, that the Church owes no loyalty to democracy, per se: "One can be Christian and serve any political regime, so long as it does not go counter to the natural law or the law of God. One can be a Christian and serve a political philosophy other than the democratic philosophy . . . What

[17] *Religion and Culture.*

matters to the political life of the world and to the solution of the crisis of civilization is not the belief that Christianity is tied up with democracy and that the Christian faith requires everyone to be democratic; but the understanding that democracy is connected with Christianity . . . "[18] It is a curious one-way street. On what logical and human grounds can loyalty from democrats be demanded for an institution which may support a political regime that is dedicated to wiping democracy off the face of the earth? The Church can't have its cake and eat it too.

Of course, Maritain is merely recognizing on paper what has already transpired in real life. In Europe radical democrats and socialists understand these things better than we do here, for there the Church *has* actively supported anti-democratic regimes — Schuschnigg in Austria, Franco in Spain, Salazar in Portugal, Mussolini in Italy, etc. If its religious monopoly is not disturbed, it will countenance any kind of political regime. Because of its own authoritarian nature and structure, as a matter of fact, it gravitates more naturally in the direction of such authoritarian regimes than towards democratic ones. It is paganism, rather than totalitarianism, that worries the Church.

In truth the essence of the matter is easily stated. There is a basic antagonism between the democratic faith and the demands of the Church. The Church believes in imposing a unanimity of opinion by authority; democrats believe in arriving at judgments by discussion. The Church insists on the existence of one eternal immutable truth (which it has) and can't ever admit to error; democrats recognize a multiplicity of truths, the tentative nature of each truth, the existence of error and the right, nay the necessity of future rectification of past and present judgments in the light of experience. The democratic faith and the scientific temper move hand in hand.

The True Religion

Catholicism does not believe in freedom of worship. Such an attitude is, of course, in conflict with the presuppositions of a free democratic society. In countries where its communicants are in the minority, Catholicism would claim for itself the prerogatives of free worship guaranteed by a democratic society. But if Catholics are in the majority, it would not (and does not) allow freedom of worship. This is done on the predication that Catholicism is the only true religion, all others being abominable heresies. The true religion

[18] *Christianity and Democracy.*

being known, it is the duty of the state, according to Catholic doctrine, to support and propagate it.

Though people are wont to tread warily in discussing this subject, it is necessary to bring it out clearly into the light of day. The record is there for all to read. In his encyclical, "Immortale Dei," Pope Leo XIII said: "It is a sin in the state not to have care of religion . . . or out of the many forms of religion to adopt that one which chimes in with the fancy, for we are bound absolutely to worship God in that way which He hath shown to be His will" (i.e. of course, the Catholic way). In their book, *Catholic Principles of Politics,* Ryan and Boland say: "No state is justified in supporting error or in according error the same recognition as truth," the truth again, of course, being identical with the Catholic faith. In Attwater's *A Catholic Dictionary,* the article on "Freedom of Worship" contains the following: " . . . (re) the alleged right of individuals to worship or not, and if they do, to use any form of worship they please, *there is no such right* (my emphasis—J.C.) . . . The inalienable right of all men to worship God according to the teachings of the Catholic Church. No state can justifiably prevent the exercise of this right. Indeed the state has a duty to foster this true worship, and to prevent . . . injury to the Church by the propagation of false religions." The record is crystal clear! Its central theme is defended with many subtle variations by Maritain throughout all his writings.

Personalism and Democracy

Pious personalities are inclined to be rather naive in accepting fully on faith the broad claims that are often made for some abstractly stated religious proposition, provided it is stated with spirit and has plenty of spirituality in it. It has, for instance, been said by a follower of Berdyaev that his "personalist mystique of vital religion can supply the spiritualist resources to resist totalitarianism." In making such a rash claim he should have been forewarned by the example of the Catholic Church that proclaimed loyalty to the highest revealed religious truths is no guarantee against embracing totalitarianism on earth. There simply is no correlation between general religious dogmas and concrete political and social activities on earth, and it is quite possible for two adherents of a similar faith to embrace opposite courses of action in the real world. And so Berdyaev, in spite of the abstract obeisance he pays to the worth of the individual, finds it quite possible to be a virulent critic of democracy on the one hand, and a gentle appeaser of fascism on the other!

1) "It must also be noted that in spite of their unhealthy nature, both Fascism and Nazism contain some positive values. Among such we may note the sound criticism of formal political democracy, which is living through a mortal crisis; in the desire to set up a real corporation or syndical representation, truly (!) representing the economic and professional interests of the people; in the elimination of party conflicts and *even in the necessity of a powerful authority* (my emphasis—J.C.) . . . that old socialist, Mussolini, who now cannot bear the sound of the word, is nevertheless engaged at present in working out a very radical socialist program and we'll probably see it realized . . . in essence, Mussolini says the same things as Marx . . . the old forms of democracy hinder the radical reform of human society, and new forms are appearing, more mobile, more dynamic, more capable of swift action, better suited to the instincts of modern youth. Fascism is one of those evolving forms."[19]

2) " . . . in its normal peaceful state, it (democracy) . . . finds a thousand ways of reducing human personality to uniformity and stifling their free-spiritedness. *There was probably more real liberty of the spirit when the fires of the Spanish Inquisition were burning than in the middle class republics of today wherein spirit and religious conscience are themselves denied.*" (my emphasis—J.C.)[20] Anti-democrat, praiser of Fascism, this is the Messiah who is to lead us out of the Wilderness! It seems quite in order that in his latest phase, Berdyaev has gotten around to praising Stalinist Russia.

Conclusion

Somewhere Niebuhr (I write from memory here), in commenting upon the justly famous last paragraph of Bertrand Russell's *Free Man's Worship* ("Brief and Powerless is Man's life . . . ," etc.), refers to its (for him) essential futility, in spite of the pretended note on noble stoicism struck, because of its neglect of the teleological purposiveness supposedly inherent in life and nature, and its unwillingness to surrender itself to the inscrutible mercy of the Godhead. Yet, for me, Russell's note of sober realism and wise resignation is infinitely preferable to the delectations of supernaturalism for, at least, it involves no self-delusion, no violation of reason and logic, and no chasing after non-existent wraiths.

Freedom is the knowledge of necessity, and the wise man early learns to free himself of fears of the unknown and the inevitabilities he cannot avoid. He refuses to be frightened by the short span of

[19] *The Fate of Man in the Modern World*, pp. 63-66. England, 1935.
[20] *End of our Time*, Sheed and Ward, 1933, p. 177.

life, and to be stampeded by the inevitability of death into embracing the unknown for his pretended soul's sake. Spinoza had it that the wise man ponders on nothing so little as death, and those philosophers (including our Existentialists) who raise death to such philosophical stature might still learn some elementary wisdom from the old sage.

The humanist centers attention upon this world. For him time and space are enough, earth is enough. Today is his, and the known and the possible-to-be-known offer illimitable room for him to roam about in. The unknowable offers no measurable competition to his energies.

The earth is shattered, the people helpless and confused. Our tasks are great and we need all the energy, courage, vision, and moral rectitude we can muster if we are to pull our sorry world back from the edge of the bottomless abyss on which it is so precariously perched. We dare not let ourselves be bewitched by a doctrine which places such a heavy discount upon the potentialities of man to help himself.

We know the ideals we have, we know the ends we seek. We refuse to place their bastions in a theologic and supernaturalist moat. If the biologic and psychologic capacities of man, working toward desired and just ends within the permissive limitation of political and social organization, remain unequal to their self-imposed tasks, then no appeal to supernaturalist sanctions can change it one whit for the better.

We need to regain confidence in the abilities we have and the possibilities that remain open. We need to exercise continuously that part of us which can engage in dispassionate analysis, face facts and weigh propositions. These sorry and disillusioning times call for the re-affirmation and re-dedication to the values of science and an ethical secular humanism. There is no guarantee in a world full of pitfalls and dangers that the ends they seek to attain will be realized. But if they fail, nothing else can succeed.

TO CURE THAT UN HEADACHE

Synhexyl, a drug which makes this sad world seem cheerful, has been tried on fifty patients by Dr. G. Tayleur Stockings . . . of the British Medical Association. Of the fifty patients thirty-six showed marked improvements. . . Some patients who took the drug in a capsule before breakfast felt brighter, more cheerful and confident, and showed more initiative and interest in work or other activities.—New York *Times.*

"APRISMO"—IS IT SOCIALIST?

Robert J. Alexander

The second indigenous Latin American political movement may be labelled "Aprismo." This name comes from the *Partido Aprista* (now called the *Partido del Pueblo*) of Peru. The famous leader of this party is Victor Raul Haya de la Torre.

The tendency, which for convenience we label "Aprismo," is not confined to the *Aprista* Party of Peru however. There are similar groups in Venezuela, where the *Accion Democratica* is now in charge of the government; in Paraguay, where the recent revolt against President Morinigo was headed by Colonel Franco, chief of the *Aprista*-like *Partido Feberista;* in Cuba, where the *Partido Autentico* of President Grau San Martin has been in power since 1944. The *Apristas* also usually claim the *Partido Accion Revolucionaris* of Guatemala, headed by President Jose Arevalo, as part of their movement.

The *Apristas,* like the *Peronistas,* represent one expression of the mass revolt which is today sweeping Latin America. This movement of unrest and protest is the most significant single fact about the social and political situation in the Latin American countries today. Neither the United States nor any other power can successfully suppress this spirit of revolt. It is part of the spirit of the times, and is certainly not limited to the Americas—the so-called "awakening of Asia" represents the same kind of general movement. All the United States might conceivably do is to aid those expressions of this revolt that are likely in the long run to prove friendly to democracy and oppose those manifestations that seem headed toward totalitarianism. The revolt takes different forms in different countries, and if the progressive, democratic organizations which arise as a result of it can be given a fair chance, they may be able to institute the necessary social, economic and political changes in Latin America while at the same time providing for an expanding political and social democracy rather than turning toward totalitar-

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ROBERT J. ALEXANDER, formerly Latin American correspondent for the *New Leader,* now teaches at Rutger's. His first article in *Modern Review,* to which this is a companion piece, was entitled " 'Peronismo'—Is It Fascist?" and appeared in the October 1947 issue.

ianism. It is the *Aprista* group of parties that seem to me to be headed in what is essentially the right direction and which, therefore, are deserving of our support.

The *Aprista* parties are not doctrinaire or dogmatic. The *Partido del Pueblo* of Peru originally talked more or less in Marxist terms, but has since wandered a considerable distance from orthodox Marxism. In Venezuela, members of the *Partido Accion Democratica* refer to themselves as "the Socialists." In Cuba, one of the principal leaders of the *Autentico* labor movement told me that *Autenticos* are "Socialist Nationalists." All three of these parties are loosely affiliated and have sent delegates to Inter-American congresses of socialist and popular parties, the last of which was held in Santiago, Chile, in March 1946. This congress set up a bureau with headquarters in Caracas, Venezuela, under direction of the *Accion Democratica* leader and ex-minister Luis Lander.

All of the *Aprista* leaders agree, however, that their organizations must be "popular" parties rather than class parties in the strict Marxian sense. They feel there is no place as yet for a distinctly working-class party. What is needed, they believe, is rather a broad party which can draw the industrial proletariat, the agriculture worker, small farmer and the urban lower middle class together in one organization. The aim of this type of organization is to put an end to the "oligarchies," bring about gradual but effective agrarian reform and institute political democracy. It is generally held that ideas which were developed for industrial Europe do not necessarily apply in relatively backward Latin America, with its different races and different problems. In Venezuela, I was told emphatically by one of the *Accion Democratica* leaders that one of the reasons for the success of the *Accion Democratica* government was that the party *was not bound* by any rigid doctrine, and thus could experiment—particularly in the field of agriculture—and apply reform measures that seemed indicated rather than having to conform to any ideological rule book.

It is interesting that although the leaders of the various *Aprista* parties are well acquainted with one another, there has been little conscious imitation of one *Aprista* party's ideas or methods by another. One of the principal figures in the *Accion Democratica,* while admitting the similarity of his organization to the *Aprista* Party of Peru, claimed that the similarity is largely coincidental and due to similarity of conditions and needs rather than to consultation between the two groups or to conscious imitation. The case of the

Cuban *Autenticos* is something of an exception in this regard, since there once existed a *Partido Aprista* in Cuba which joined with other groups to form the *Autentico* Party. and brought many of Haya de la Torre's ideas to the molding of this organization.

The *Aprista* parties all have great strength in working class, as well as middle class, circles. In Peru, once the series of dictatorships was brought to an end in 1945, and the *Apristas* were able to emerge, they rapidly gained control of the labor movement of that country. This control had previously been in the hands of the Communists, who worked closely with the dictatorships. In Venezuela, the *Accion Democratica* has been the preponderant political force in the labor movement of that country for the last four or five years, the control becoming really decisive after the October, 1945, revolution which put the *Accion Democratica* in control of the government. In Cuba the *Autenticos* had considerable influence in the labor movement for many years, though it was dominated by the Communists. In the middle of 1947, however, there was a split in the labor movement, the *Autentico* and Communist unions going different ways. The chances seem to be that the *Autenticos* will soon emerge in more or less complete control of the labor movement in that country. In Paraguay before the recent uprising, the *Febreristas* and the Communists were fighting it out for supremacy.

The *Aprista* parties are penetrating deeper and deeper into the peasant and agricultural worker classes. In Peru, for instance, since coming out into the open in 1945, the *Apristas* have devoted particular attention to the problems of the Indian communities and small Indian landholders and have been able to do a great deal for these groups. As a result the *Partido del Pueblo* is extending its organization into the most isolated Indian communities, something which no other party in Peruvian history was ever able to do. The Communists had for a time some organization among the Indians and agricultural workers, but the *Aprista* influence has practically eliminated the Communists from that field.

In Venezuela, too, since the October 1945 Revolution, the *Accion Democratica* has made great inroads into the agricultural worker element. Of the 700 trade unions formed since 1945, some 350 have been formed among agricultural workers, almost all of these being under the control of the *Accion Democratica* Party. The Government is drawing up and executing vast plans for division of the land, turning some of the land over to the "*campesimos*" as the peasants are called, and in other cases establishing experimental

agricultural colonies on confiscated land. The result of all this is that *Accion Democratica* now has organizations in almost all parts of the country, and the peasants and agricultural workers are coming to be one of the real strongholds of the party.

In Cuba the *Autenticos* also are extending their influence into the agricultural workers' ranks. This has been virtually a closed reserve, completely controlled by the Communists, but in the last year or so the *Autenticos* have made great inroads into the Communist strength, particularly among the sugar workers. The *Autenticos* now for the first time control a sizable number of sugar workers' unions, including many of the most powerful.

As might be expected, each of the *Aprista* parties has a distinctive history. The oldest of the group is the *Partido del Pueblo* or *Partido Aprista* of Peru. The movement which engendered this party got under way in the early twenties when a group of students led by Victor Raul Haya de la Torre launched a workers' education project in Lima and Callao and came into close contact with a group of labor leaders (anarcho-syndicalists for the most part) who were eager to cooperate in this venture. Although the future *Apristas* had no intention of making a political issue out of their project, the Government practically forced politics upon them by opposing their scheme, in some cases preventing the opening of the so-called Popular Universities by force. The Government finally in May 1923 seized on the incident of a student worker demonstration as the occasion to expel Haya de la Torre from the country and take violent measures against other leaders. During the next seven years most of the *Aprista* student-leaders were exiled,while a few of them and a group of workers, led by Arturo Sabroso, a young textile union leader, kept the ideas of Haya alive.

With the fall of Dictator-President Agusto B. Leguia in 1930, the exiled *Apristas* were allowed to return and for almost a year were permitted to go about organizing their party openly. It swiftly became the most important popular force in the country, virtually the only really popular party. With the coming of the Sanchez Cerro dictatorship, however, the *Aprista* leaders were again arrested, exiled or driven into hiding, Haya de la Torre himself spending a year in jail. There was a war to the death between the *Apristas* and Sanchez Cerro, with a full-fledged revolt in Haya's home city of Trujillo, and ending in the assassination of the Dictator, presumably by an *Aprista.* Then followed another short period of legality, ending late in 1934 with the outlawing of the *Aprista* party, and the

establishment of a new dictatorship under Oscar Benavides. This regime became increasingly more tyrannical, and when the *Apristas* won the presidential election of 1936, after only eight days of campaigning, Benavides annulled the election and had his congress declare him president for three years more.

Manuel Prado became president in 1939 in an election in which there was no serious opposition, and in which Prado was supported by the Dictator Benavides on the one hand, and the Communists on the other. The Prado regime was somewhat more lenient than its predecessor, perhaps because it was somewhat more intelligent. It permitted the revival of the labor movement to a limited degree, though labor meetings could be held only with the consent of the authorities and with detectives or uniformed policemen in attendance. The Prado regime, meanwhile, made a working accord with the Communists—tacit or oral, it was nonetheless effective—in an attempt to build up a popular force against the A.P.R.A. In spite of this, the *Apristas* remained the principal popular political force in the nation, and when President Prado's constitutional term drew to an end, old Marshal Benavides, whether from a desire to redeem his name for history or from some other motive, reached an accord with the *Apristas* which forced Prado to permit the election of a successor, in a poll which was admittedly one of the cleanest in the country's history.

A few weeks before the 1945 presidential election, the *Aprista* Party was legalized under the name of the *Partido del Pueblo*. The exiles again returned and Haya de la Torre, who had been in hiding since 1934, appeared in public to address a great meeting of some 250,000 people in the Plaza San Martin. This was probably the most impressive public demonstration in the country's history. In a short but hectic campaign the *Apristas* pushed the candidacy of Jose Bustamante y Rivero, a conservative but democratic diplomat, for the presidency, and put forward a full slate of candidates for the Senate and Chamber of Deputies. The result was that Bustamante was elected president by a smashing majority, the *Apristas* got a majority in the Chamber of Deputies, and almost a majority in the Senate.

Since 1945 Peru has been experiencing the most democratic period in its history. There is freedom of speech, assembly, press; the unions function without benefit of police observance; there is actual political life and controversy.

Meanwhile, the *Apristas* are carrying on their campaign to

spread their organization throughout the country. Great union-organizing campaigns are under way. For the first time serious attention is being given to the needs and rights of the Indians. Plans are being drawn for the diversification of agriculture and industrialization of the country. The *Apristas,* however, are under pitiless attack from almost the entire press of the country and from all other political groups which are using every conceivable type of argument, fair and foul, to destroy their reputation. Nevertheless the *Apristas* remain confident that in 1951 they will complete the revolution, which they began in 1945, by putting Haya de la Torre in the president's palace, thus being in a position to carry out the full *Aprista* program for advancement of Peru and the bettering of the conditions of its people.

The *Accion Democratica* party in Venezuela has already had its revolution. The *Accion Democratica* evolved from the *Partido Democratica Nacional* which was formed in the administration of General Eleazar Lopez Contreras in the late 1930's after the death of old Dictator Juan Vicente Gomez. The *Partido Democratica Nacional* was heavily persecuted under the Lopez Contreras regime, but in 1941, with the coming to power of General Isais Medina Angarita, it was legalized under the name *Accion Democratica,* and soon became the principal opposition party. During this early period of repression under Lopez Contreras, the *Accion Democratica* was distinctly the minority group in the labor movement of the country. However, as the Medina regime continued, the *Accion Democratica* gained more opportunities for legal operation. It then emerged as the principal party of the opposition and slowly began to force the Communists out of their control of the labor unions. By 1943 the control of a majority of the unions had passed to the *Accion Democratica.* This was particularly true in the oil fields, where the country's largest and most important trade union organizations are located.

The Communists, meanwhile, were working very closely with the Medina Angarita regime, in line with their international policy of "National Unity," and particularly in the trade unions were discouraging all activities which might "embarrass the government."

Early in 1945 a group of young military men, disgusted with the corruptness which was the hallmark of the Medina regime, and disgusted, too, with the fact that the Army was top-heavy with generals who were barring the road to all future progress for the younger men in their profession, began to plot the overthrow of the Medina regime. A number of these young military men had been opponents of the Gomez regime, and had more or less advanced social ideas

They decided that any regime which they would establish should be aimed against the tradition of more or less open military dictatorships which had existed in Venezuela virtually since independence.

In order to carry out such an anti-militarist military uprising, this group of young officers had to have the cooperation of a political party. They finally turned to the *Accion Democratica,* which, as they put it, was the only party on the national scene which was at the same time both a progressive party and devoted to the national interests. A working alliance was formed between the young military group and the *Accion Democratica* Party which bore fruit in the uprising of October, 1945. After a few days sharp fighting in and around the capital—during which the Communists were armed by the Medina government and fought against the revolution—the revolutionaries were victorious and a new regime, headed by a seven-man *Junta Revolucionaria* was established.

This *Junta Revolucionaria,* of which Romulo Betancourt, head of the *Partido Accion Democratica* was president, was a new turn in Venezuelan affairs. It was composed of five civilians and two military men, four of the civilians being members of the *Accion Democratica.* It promised that none of its members would be candidate for President of the Republic in the elections which the new regime promised would be held soon. The Junta also promised widespread reforms.

Since 1945 the Government has been busy carrying out these reforms. The results have been astonishing. In the educational field, for instance, the number of students in primary schools was increased from 281,000 in October, 1945, to 420,000 in June 1947. A system of school lunchrooms has been established with the number of children eating in such lunchrooms increasing from 1,500 in October, 1945, to 24,000 in 1947. The feeding of 50,000 children is provided for in the budget for the 1947-8 fiscal year. The Government has built about 70 new rural schools, and there are 70 more under construction—this in a country in which previously the number of rural schools could be counted on the fingers of two hands. The plan of the Government is to provide facilities each year for an additional 50,000 school children over a period of five years.

In other fields, the changes have been almost as radical. Whereas there was practically no immigration into Venezuela before the Revolution, the present government is greatly encouraging immigration and expects that in the year 1947 some 25,000 Europeans will have migrated to that country. Many of these newcomers are being settled on land in cooperative and individual farming projects which

the Government has established. Aside from the immigrant farming projects the Government plans that in the year 1947 some 100,000 hectares (about 200,000 acres) of land will be opened up to cultivation by cooperative farming experiments.

In the field of labor, too, the change has been astounding. In 1945 there were some 200 trade unions in the country. In July 1947 there were more than 900 unions registered with the Ministry of Labor. The number of organized workers jumped from an estimated 20,000 before the Revolution to about 125,000 less than two years later. The Minister of Labor, and member of the *Junta Revolucionaria,* Dr. Raul Leoni, estimates that there has been a sizable increase in the real wages of the Venezuelan workers since 1945. The cost of living index has gone up to about 140 with 100 as the index number at the time of the Revolution; while wages have gone up to 165-175 on the same scale.

Finally, to mention two more aspects of the Government's program, there have been some four thousand workers' homes built in the first twenty months of the revolutionary regime, almost all of them in the interior, where virtually no housing projects existed previously. The Government has decreed that all foreign oil companies must reinvest 50% of their profits in Venezuela, thus stimulating the industrialization of the country.

Cuba, too, has seen an *Aprista* party come to power—the *Partido Revolucionario Cubano* (*Autentico*), generally known by the part of its title which is in parenthesis. The Cuban experience has been less satisfactory than that of Venezuela. Although the Grau San Martin government has carried on a number of very useful road building and workers' housing projects, it has not, apparently, been able to curb one of the great evils of Cuba politics—the tremendous graft which has marred practically all of the country's governments. Nor has the Grau government done anything fundamental to change the dangerous dependence of the nation's economy on the sugar industry. The *Autenticos'* government has been fortunate to be in power during a period of economic prosperity, but the signs ahead are rather ominous, and if things continue as at present, there will no doubt be a general disillusionment among the *Autentico* followers. Such a disillusionment has apparently already begun, as is indicated by the split-away of Senator Eddy Chibas and a sizable portion of the *Autentico* membership. The *Autenticos* have not developed any logical successor to Grau San Martin as president and there is a potentially dangerous trend

of thinking among the *Autenticos* for the reelection of Dr. Grau, although the Constitution forbids this. Such a move would be a serious blow to the democracy which Grau and the *Autenticos* have done so much to build.

The *Febreristas* have not been in power in Paraguay for any considerable period of time. The principal leader of the Party, Colonel Franco, was president for a short time in 1940, just long enough to enunciate a program, but not to put it into effect. With their defeat in the recent civil war, the possibility of the *Febreristas* coming to power in the near future seems remote indeed.

The *Apristas* are bringing about fundamental social transformations in Peru and Venezuela and reportedly in Guatemala. Their programs are of a long-term nature and if their parties are left in power a sufficient length of time to carry them out, the results promise to be the end of the ages-old oligarchic regimes, the establishment of more or less balanced economies, political democracy and perhaps the basis for a socialist society.

MONKEY BUSINESS

The Soviet Embassy had one day arranged for the crew (of a Russian ship) a trip to the grave of Karl Marx. He (one of the crew members) said that the British were much quicker at loading or unloading a ship than the Russians — "very good workers," he said; only, he added, they had "this funny habit of going on strike." — Alexander Werth in the *Manchester Guardian.*

HEAVY-THINKER DEPARTMENT

I approve of competition if it is not of a destructive sort, like the instinct which causes chickens to pick on each other.—Henry Wallace in the *New Republic.*

DIFFICULT PERHAPS—BUT PREFERABLE

BUSINESS IS URGED TO REMAIN HUMAN—Headline in the New York *Times.*

DEMOCRACY, LABOR AND MANAGEMENT

Peter Anders

Democracy is usually thought of as a form of government only. In classical theory it is defined as a method of arriving at the common good by carrying out the expressed will of the majority. More simply in Lincoln's words: " . . . government of the people, for the people and by the people." From the time of the Athenian town meeting to today the definition of democracy as a political concept has not changed basically. When talking of democracy, we still think primarily of general franchise, secret ballot, equality under the law. In short—we think of politics.

But even though the original meaning of democracy has not changed radically, it has been broadened considerably during these many centuries. From the Greek idea that *demos* included only freeborn citizens to the Fourteenth Amendment is a long way. Democracy has spread from society as a whole to smaller groupings —to the family, some churches, and in the last few years even to the schools. It has, to some extent, penetrated education, the arts, sciences, in short all social activities. Almost wherever we are or whatever we do, we supposedly move as equals among equals.

Yet this development has been stopped short in one of the most important, if not *the* most important, functions of our daily life. Democracy has not entered the gates of the factory. Here the authority of the owner, or his appointed representative, has not been curtailed to any marked degree. It is true of course that here too there have been slight inroads. The owner or "boss" is no longer the absolute monarch within his realm that he once was. There are such things as trade-unions, labor legislation, health protection, etc., which have somewhat narrowed his power. Nevertheless he is still the master. Business management is still "of the owner, for the owner, and by the owner."

The immemorial justification for this system has been the alleged fact that the owner, through investment of his capital, assumes

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PETER ANDERS is a Viennese socialist and economist who was active in the Austrian underground movement. In pre-war days, he was a frequent contributor to *Kampf*, the famous theoretical magazine of the Austrian movement, and currently writes for its successor *Die Zukunft*. He now lives in this country.

all the risk. But does not the worker or the salaried employe who has spent his best years with one enterprise have something more valuable than capital invested in it? He has invested his time, intelligence, skill and energy, which, unlike capital, cannot possibly be replaced. He bears a risk too, since his well-being and that of his entire family may depend on the success and continuation of the firm which employs him. The notion that only the capitalist assumes risk since he is indissolubly tied to his business while the worker can, at will, change his place of employment, is based on the assumption of full employment. Even if this assumption were true, the worker would still be subject to risk since labor is a factor in production with diminishing returns in the long run. But we know that full employment is the exception rather than the rule. Though we are slowly adjusting our thinking to this fact, we have so far failed to draw the necessary conclusions. Therefore our ideas concerning the respective roles of labor and management remain unchanged.

Labor-Management Relations

This fact was never more apparent than during recent months when attempts to revamp the relationship of management and labor in the United States crystallized in the Taft-Hartley law. During all the months of heated discussion there was not a single mention—so far as I can recall—of what would seem one of the most simple solutions to present labor-management difficulties: i.e., give labor a part in management. It seems obvious that an amalgamation of management and labor would eliminate in large part the labor-management problem. This is one of the reasons why many economists believe that a socialist economy could be more productive than our present capitalist system. Since, for technological reasons, the managerial group will always have to be separate from the main labor force, there will always remain some antagonism between management and labor. This antagonism, however, will be on a different level and will be much easier to reconcile in a socialist economy.

Socialism, however, as a solution for any kind of social problem still appears utopian in relation to present-day American society. Thus, if we are to be realistic, we cannot talk in terms of absolutes but only of labor "sharing" in management, which means accepting in part its responsibilities and benefiting somewhat from its rewards. It should be clear that such propositions are as far removed from

socialism as are the thousands of profit-sharing systems now operating throughout the United States. It is clear also that profit-sharing alone is insufficient, since through it labor participates in only one phase of management. It has no voice in shaping the future of the enterprise of which it is an integral part.

While their ultimate goal remains complete socialization of the economy (which would entail labor *taking over* management), socialists all over the world, and particularly in Europe, have long advocated various schemes of labor participation in management. In many cases, labor abroad has been unable or even unwilling to take over whole industries—let alone the whole economy. Thus, broad sections of private enterprise remain in those countries where labor is a part or even the majority of the government. In these countries the government, and therefore labor, had to determine the rules and regulations concerning labor-management relations. In many instances these rules contain provisions giving labor a share in management. The most important of these are reported here as suggesting new ways of improving labor-management relations and thereby leading to greater productivity of labor and increased industrial output.

But to my mind what is of greater import is that these new responsibilities and privileges of labor contribute to a broader concept of democracy. They constitute assaults upon that stronghold of authoritarianism, private enterprise, and attempt to bring it within the broad framework of democratic organization. It is especially important at present that democracy, under attack from all sides, prove its definite superiority to all forms of authoritarianism. A successful attempt to democratize industrial relations, which play a far greater part in man's everyday life than do purely political relations, seems practically indispensable at this juncture to the survival of democracy at large.

Labor's Part in Management

It is, of course, quite impossible to give in small space a comprehensive survey of all legislation bearing on this problem, which, during the last few years, has been enacted throughout Europe. Such an overall survey would show that almost every country in Europe has taken steps in the direction of giving labor a share in management. Here we shall deal with only the more far-reaching of these legislative attempts. The examples chosen are from Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and France.

There are two distinct types of bodies to which the term "works committee" is applied. One type is a joint committee of management and labor; the other is a pure labor body growing out of the shop steward movement. The committees established by the laws under discussion are of the second type, but there will be occasion also to survey briefly those of the first type.

Genuine works committees consist of delegates elected by the workers and salaried employes in free and secret elections from a slate submitted by either the most representative trade-union (France), by competing unions (Austria), or by the only existing trade-unions (Hungary and Czechoslovakia). The membership of these bodies—variously called works committees, factory councils, works councils, etc.—are in proportion to the size of the labor force employed. Usually the chairman and his alternate and, in very large enterprises, some additional members are excused entirely from factory work; only the French law restricts the time to be taken off—fifteen hours per month. In all cases the members of the works committees are protected against discharge without due cause. In case of a general reduction in the labor force, the dismissal of committee members requires the consent of either a labor court (Hungary), an official agency like that of the labor inspectors (France) or arbitration boards (Austria and Czechoslovakia); in Hungary this protection continues for former members of the committee for a period of two years. The term of office varies from one year (Czechoslovakia) to three (France). The entrepreneur is obliged to furnish office space and other facilities to help the committee discharge its duties.

Rights and Responsibilities

Works committees *per se* are nothing new in Europe. They had their inception in Great Britain during World War I and spread, after 1918, to the whole of Europe. Their jurisdiction was severely restricted however, except in the case of the Soviet Union and the first years of the new German and Austrian republics. In the main they were confined to welfare and similar matters, or, in countries with industrial unions, to collective bargaining at the shop level. They were also in most countries an integral part of the grievance procedure as provided for in collective agreements and, in a few cases, had a consultative voice in hiring and firing. But, in general, it may be said that participation of these committees in management was the exception rather than the rule.

This does not mean that the broader problem was not raised. As early as in 1916 in England a committee of employers' and workers' representatives, under chairmanship of J. H. Whitley, M.P., was appointed to consider means of securing a permanent improvement in industrial relations and to recommend means for a systematic review of these relations by both sides. The report of the Whitley Committee declared " . . . that a permanent improvement in the relations between employer and employed must be founded on something other than a cash basis . . . workpeople should have a greater opportunity of participating in the discussion about, and the adjustment of, those parts of industry by which they are most affected." But such activities were, in the rare cases of their practical application, restricted to top level consultations between trade union and employer organizations.

At this point it is only fair to admit, however, that a workable procedure for labor sharing in management is far from easy to devise, and that the short period of application since World War II brought about a renaissance of the original works committee idea does not provide enough evidence to judge the merits and demerits of this new approach. No judgment can as yet be made as to whether this approach has reduced labor-management friction or increased labor productivity. What makes judgment so difficult, despite the wide reaches of the experiment, is the fact that it is being carried out under the most difficult conditions. With so many obstacles in the way of efficient production, it becomes almost impossible to isolate a single cause or a single effect. The best organization remains inefficient if machines stand idle due to lack of fuel, if the human element cannot carry on because of lack of food or other causes.

Yet with all due provision made for these factors it must be granted that even under the most favorable conditions, the problem of labor sharing in management is not a simple one. The difficulty has its source in the diversified nature of modern management. The functions of management are roughly organizational, technological, commercial and financial. Each of these is carried out in the larger firms by professional specialists who have acquired their skill through years of schooling and practical experience. The complexity of modern industrial management has resulted in a separation of management and ownership almost everywhere and few individual owners of modern industrial enterprises are able to manage their

own business or even to comprehend it in its entirety. It is, therefore, quite possible that labor delegates in managerial bodies will be little more at first than idle bystanders, or that they will try to interfere in matters beyond their knowledge. If these new privileges are to count, labor must train certain of its members for these tasks while management must receive the newcomers in a cooperative spirit. But even more important in the beginning is that labor gain the sense of being a partner all along the line.

Hiring and Firing

A better understanding of the multitude of problems involved, however, can be gained by analyzing a selected number of instances where the new legislation provides for the participation of labor in managerial functions. Hiring and firing, one of the traditional privileges of management, was the first in which labor participated directly. Such participation exists even in countries like the United States where labor-management schemes still tend to be looked upon as 'revolutionary' innovations. The closed shop (recently outlawed by the Taft-Hartley law) is an example where labor had gained a considerable influence on hiring, and there are instances in which the unions have gained sole control of hiring. (The National Maritime Union in the United States is a case in point.)

In Europe where strong unions have been able, often without legal protection or even contractual obligation on the part of management, to maintain one hundred percent unionization of an enterprise, not much attention has been given to the right of participation in hiring. Thus, the Austrian law stipulates only that all new hirings have to be reported to the works committees while the Czech text mentions that " . . . factory councils are entitled to take part in . . . the employment of new workers . . . "; the Hungarian and French legislation fails even to refer to the problem of hiring.[1]

Far more important than participation in hiring are the powers granted to the committees with respect to mass dismissals or lay-offs. While nothing of this kind has been achieved by American labor, there are definite provisions relating to these matters in the European legislation. The Austrian law entitles the works committee to object against any firings or dismissals. If the employer ignores the

[1]In all countries under discussion, the official labor exchanges are either exclusively organized and supervised by the trade unions or under the administration of joint committees of which labor is an integral part. In addition, unemployment played rather a minor role in these countries in the postwar period.

objection, the case goes to an Arbitration Board, a state institution consisting of representatives of labor, management, and the public. The works committee must also approve the transfer of any employee if such a transfer entails lower earnings or worse working conditions. In case of contemplated shutdowns or extensive lay-offs in enterprises employing more than 500 people, a two-thirds majority of the works committee must agree. If there is a failure to agree, no action can be taken by management before the State Economic Commission hands down its decision which is final.

In the Hungarian law, no provision concerning individual dismissals—except in the mining industry—is to be found. In the case of contemplated mass dismissals however, the employer is obliged to apply for a ministerial permit with the approval of the works committee. The committee has also to be consulted in the selection of the workers to be laid off after permission has been granted. In Czechoslovakia, the text of the law is less specific; it only grants the committee the right " . . . to take part in the release of workers . . . ," while the French legislation refers only to the fact that works committees have to be consulted on questions concerning the organization and general operation of the enterprise. Some participation of labor in hiring and firing is also provided by the Labor Foundation in the Netherlands, a permanent joint body of employers' associations and trade unions. In some cases, considerable influence of the trade unions in hiring and firing also exists in most European countries through collective bargaining agreements in essential industries.

Hiring and firing is a special case in labor-management relations since it is a contract between them and it should not be a surprise that the two parties to the contract should have a voice in its start and termination. The great progressive step is not the protection of the individual worker, but the fact that for the first time the economic significance of mass dismissals is recognized, and labor and the public are given a voice in decisions which may have a far-reaching effect for them. But this still is not a significant intrusion in the main business of management: the running of the enterprise.

Labor's Share in Planning Production

The stage indicated by the previously quoted passage of the Whitley Report is reached only when management is forced to grant labor a voice in the actual planning of production. Only insofar

as the new laws provide for this kind of cooperation do they represent a real step forward in industrial democracy.

Most outspoken on this important point is the Austrian and Hungarian legislation. The Austrian law states that " . . . the works committee has to (a) safeguard and further the economic, cultural, social and health interest of the employees and (b) take part in the administration and management of the enterprise . . . " It adds, " . . . the committee is called upon to make suggestions to management and to make propositions which aim to increase the efficiency and productivity of the enterprise for the sake of the national economy and in the interest of the enterprise and its employees . . . " For this purpose, management must inform the committee of the general economic situation of the firm, of production, flow and backlog of orders, sales volume and of all measures contemplated to increase the output of the enterprise. Joint monthly meetings of management and the committee are to be held at which these problems can be discussed. In large scale enterprises (defined in the Austrian law as those employing 500 or more people), a two-thirds majority of the committee may appeal to the State Economic Commission whenever their proposals are overruled by management and they feel that this refusal would be detrimental to the national economy. In order to facilitate the work of the committee it has to be given access to the books and records of the firm, including the balance sheets and periodic income statements.

The provisions of the Hungarian law are similar. Here the committees are required to collaborate with management in planning production and in introducing new methods whose aim is to increase efficiency and output and should also participate in supervision of production and checking operational arrangements. Similar joint meetings as described above for Austria are to be held every three months. Here too, there is a possibility of appeal, this time to the National Arbitration Board and with a simple majority but with the approval of the trade union. The Hungarian law, as well as the Austrian, has a provision that in joint stock corporations, limited liability companies and in cooperatives, the work committee must be represented on the board of directors in an advisory capacity.

The most interesting feature in both cases—and the most revolutionary as compared with previous legislation in both countries—is the right to appeal to a newly created national body, the State Economic Commission in Austria, and the National Arbitration Board

in Hungary. Both groups are joint committees of management and labor under neutral chairmanship (in Austria the Secretary of Commerce, in Hungary a representative of the public appointed by the Secretary of Industry). They are supposed to act as umpires between management and labor whenever their ideas on how to improve the contributions of the individual firms to the national economy clash. Therefore, the work committees instead of merely being representatives of local labor groups are made responsible for the well-being of the national economy as a whole while at the same time management is compelled to subordinate private to public interests. Thus, labor is not only given a share in managing a particular business in which it happens to be employed but at the same time is the representative of the public in the decisions of this particular business enterprise.

Much narrower is the influence on purely economic issues of the works committees in the French legislation. They are supposed to study suggestions for increasing production or improving output made by members of the staff or of management and may propose the utilization of suggestions they consider useful. They have to be consulted on questions concerning the organization, management and general operation of the enterprise and have to be informed about profits and may make suggestions in that respect. In the case of joint stock corporations, the yearly report to the stockholders, the income statement and the report of the auditors, has to be communicated to the committee before submission to the stockholders' meeting. The auditors may be assisted by a special auditor representing the works committee who is to be paid by the management. A comprehensive explanation of all data has to be given to the committee which may make observations and suggestions. Those have to be submitted to the stockholders at the same time as the annual report. The French law also has a provision similar to the one mentioned above concerning representation on the board of directors.

It is interesting to note that the French law restricts the collaboration of the works committee to problems of the individual enterprise and that—as is explicitly stated in the preamble—the works committees have a purely consultative function. The old principle of the sole responsibility of management is not altered. There is, however, the possibility of an appeal when the committees are overruled by management. If their suggestions are rejected again when resubmitted after a three months' period, the committee may carry an

appeal to the Inspector General of Industrial Production. The latter may, if he approves the suggestion, submit it to the competent agencies (these are so-called "organizing committees" and are set up by industry or by trade) which must in turn consult their joint advisory committee before rendering a decision which is final. In addition, a Superior Commission for Works Committees on a national level is established by law to deal with difficulties as they arise and to study measures for the satisfactory operation of the works committees.

As usual, the Czech text is the least explicit. It states very briefly that " . . . the factory council will take part in planning and controlling production," and furthermore that " . . . the works administration must consider proposals put forward by the factory council as regards production and administration and give monthly reports on the situation in the work." Appeal in the case of refusal on the part of management may be carried to arbitration boards at the regional offices of the Ministry of Labor or for final decision to a Central Arbitration Board at the Ministry of Labor itself. It does not appear as if the influence of the works committee would be substantial. However, an official publication of the Czech trade unions calls "the works council an important factor which controls the working of a democratic economic system. It is their task to ensure that management and labor follow the general interests of national economy in their undertakings . . . they now play an important part in national economy; they are becoming an important factor controlling the economy of a people's democracy. The law contains certain clauses which fulfilled old desires of the working people and which secures for them powers to control production . . . Works councils have a right not only to be consulted and to make decisions about the production of goods and wealth, but also to ensure that distribution is not only based on the interests of one individual, but that it corresponds to the interests of the whole and to the economic needs of society." A unique part of the Czech law is the method used for financing the activities of the works committees. A sum, not less than 10 percent of the enterprise's profits, must be allocated each year by management to the factory council for the social needs of the employees.

Industrial and National Committees

During the preceding discussion of committees on the individual plant or enterprise level, reference was occasionally made to committees of a higher order insofar as they represented a possi-

bility of appeal of individual decisions. In addition, in almost all nations with works committee legislation, further legislation establishes organizations for labor-management relations on an industry-wide or nation-wide level. Already mentioned is the State Economic Commission of Austria which has to rule on shut-downs and mass lay-offs as well as being the deciding authority in controversies on economic matters between works committees and management.

In Hungary, joint Industrial Production Committees for each branch of industry have been organized. The functions of these committees are: to propose to the associations of workers and employers within the branch of industry concerned reforms of methods of work, manufacturing processes, standards of output and rates of pay, to supervise application of those suggestions and to submit matters of general importance to the Industrial Production Council which concurrently acts as a court of appeal. If a decision is accepted voluntarily or if an appeal of management has been overruled, decisions of the Industrial Production Committees are enforceable and penalties are provided for non-compliance. The Industrial Production Council is appointed by the government to coordinate the work of the Industrial Production Committees and has the power to enact regulations which have legal force.

The superior body, according to the French legislation, is the National Labor Council, formed of representatives of the national organizations of labor and management as well as delegates from other sectors of the economy. The council consists of a plenary assembly, a permanent commission and technical sections for the study of special problems. The council's main function is the study of problems connected with and concerning labor, it gives opinions and makes recommendations; one of its main functions being the integration of trade union activities with the work of government agencies. The Superior Council for Works Committees and the authorities to rule on suggestions of the works committees disputed by management have been discussed previously. Lately an additional agency has been formed in the National Economic Council, a consultative body whose function is to advise on economic and labor legislation; it contains 45 representatives of organized labor.

The appeal boards of Czechoslovakia have already been mentioned; in view of the far-reaching nationalization of industry, there seems to be no provision for a national organization outside the trade unions.

The works committees of Great Britain have also expanded their scope of activities but the main emphasis during the war was on the speeding up of production. However, those organizations on a higher level, e.g. the Regional Boards for Industry, or the nationwide National Production Advisory Council, are joint committees under neutral leadership. Their function is consultative, but covers almost all of the widespread economic activities of the Labor Government. It is well known that representatives of labor play an outstanding role in the nationalized sectors of industry, while the so-called "Working Parties" which investigate individual industries with the purpose of recommending improvements consist of four members each from labor, management, and the public under an independent chairman. In the recently created Economic Planning Board, the top authority for the nation as a whole, the trade unions have three delegates, equal to the number of industry representatives.

A joint body, containing representatives of most of the unions and employer associations in the Labor Foundation of the Netherlands, has already been mentioned. Its main objective is the improvement of working conditions but it also advises the government on economic, social and labor policies. Belgium has instituted joint committees in each industry with a scope similar to the Dutch body. These Belgian committees have free access to all books and documents of individual enterprises and their decisions have legal force.

Italy chose the way of a private agreement between the National Association of Italian Industry and the Confederation of Industrial Workers. The agreement, to be in force for three years, sets up joint committees for individual industries, to find ways to improve production and means of production, as well as to determine general plans of production, balances and budgets.

In a few instances, management and labor in the United States have set up industry-wide joint committees which deal to some extent with problems of the industry usually reserved for management. The experience limited mainly to the needle trades of New York shows very satisfactory results and the industries concerned are proud of their record in labor-management relations. On the other hand, Congress recently passed the Taft-Hartley bill which contains no provision entitling organized labor to participate in the managerial functions within industry. On a nationwide basis the Employment Act of 1946 provided for a Council of Economic Advisors

to the President, men "who as a result of training, experience, and attainments, are especially qualified to analyze and interpret economic developments, to appraise programs and activities of the government and to formulate and recommend national economic policy." Among the three advisers nominated by the President, there is no representative of, or anyone even loosely connected with, organized labor. The conclusion seems inescapable that far from pioneering in labor-management relations in any basic sense, the United States is remaining far behind much of the rest of the world in this respect. As this is the arena in which democracy is likely to be tested —and perhaps revitalized—in coming years, this lag, if allowed to continue, may lead to extremely serious consequences affecting not only the economy but also the "American way of life."

PREPARING A STALIN SYMPHONY PERHAPS?

No one is outwardly healthier and less "neurotic" than Shostakovich, and yet he is interested in strange sensations as part of his creative process. For reasons hard to analyze he insisted for a few days in succession on visiting a slaughter-house.—Alexander Werth in the *Manchester Guardian.*

ADD IMPORTANT AFTERTHOUGHTS

He (General MacArthur) said the Ryuku Islands were the natural frontier of the U.S.A. and he did not believe the Japanese would have any objection to the U.S.A. keeping Okinawa, if they had any choice in the matter.—*PM.*

INTERNATIONAL PRESS

SARTRE AND THE STALINISTS

Jean-Paul Sartre, in the last of a series of articles entitled "What Is Literature?" (*Les Temps Modernes*, July, 1947), outlines his present position in relation to Stalinism and politics in general. This article is being hotly debated among French intellectuals of the Left. Unfortunately we have space for only a few excerpts—sufficient to illustrate Sartre's general point of view though inadequate as a completely rounded picture of his present position. It is to be hoped that the whole series of articles will soon become available to American readers in book form.

It is no longer the reign of the proletariat that the Communists are preparing in their land of origin, states Sartre, but war—war alone. If the USSR is victorious, she will spread her regime over Europe and nations will fall like ripe fruit. If she is vanquished, she will perish together with the Communist parties. To reassure the bourgeoisie without losing the confidence of the masses, to take positions in the governing apparatus without giving up the appearance of offensive tactics, to occupy posts of command without being compromised by them—that is the policy of the CP. We were the witnesses and victims in 1939-40 of the rottening of a war, we now witness the rottening of a revolutionary situation. . .

If one asks whether the writer, in order to reach the masses, should offer his services to the Communist Party, I answer NO! The politics of Stalinist Communism in France are incompatible with the honest exercise of the literary profession. . . The CP presents today an ambiguous face: it is progressive and revolutionary in its doctrine and its avowed ends, but conservative in its means. Even before taking power it adopts the spirit, the reasoning and trickeries of those who have long held power, feel it slipping from their grasp and want at all costs to maintain it. Joseph de Maistre (the great Catholic apologist for monarchy and opponent of the French Revolution) and Mr. Garaudy (a leading Stalinist intellectual) have something in common—and it isn't talent. . . The Stalinist intellectual adopts the attitude of the French general staff which condemned Dreyfus on the basis of "secret" documents. They never answer their adversary: they smear him. He is a police or intelligence agent, a fascist. If you ask for proofs, they are never given because they are horrible and would implicate too many people. You are asked to accept the charges on faith. . . The Stalinist intellectual adopts the Manichaeanism of the reactionary — only he divides the world according to different principles. A Trotskyist to a Stalinist—just as a Jew to Maurras—is an incarnation of Evil. Everything that emanates from him is necessarily bad. The possession of certain titles, on the other hand, assures immediate grace. Compare this sentence of Joseph de Maistre: "The married woman is necessarily chaste" with that of a correspondent in the Communist *Action*: "The Communist is the permanent hero of our times." That heroes can be found in the Communist Party, I am the first to recognize. So what? Has no married woman ever shown weak-

ness? No, because she is married before God. To become a hero is it sufficient to become a Communist? Yes, because the CP is the party of heroes. But suppose I mention the name of a Communist who has somehow failed? He wouldn't be a *true* Communist.

An intellectual is always suspect to the Communist Party. Since he chose to enter the party of his own free will, he may also some day choose to leave it. He entered the party by criticizing the policies of his class of origin. He may, therefore, some day criticize the policies of the representatives of his adopted class. A malediction will hang over him for his entire life. Beginning with his initiation, a trial begins for him that resembles that which Kafka describes — a trial in which the judges are unknown, the files secret and in which the only definitive judgments are condemnations. The judges will never prove his guilt; he must prove his innocence. . . If he thinks he can get away with simply showing blind obedience, he is wrong. A show of brilliance, of biting wit, of lucidity, of invention, is demanded of him. But at the same time these demands are made, he is accused on the basis of these very same attributes, because they suggest an inclination toward crime. . . Thus the fault is in him like the worm in the fruit. He must not be cynical either, for cynicism is a vice as obnoxious as good will. . . He must know how to ignore things; he must see what shouldn't be seen, but he must also forget what he has seen so as never to reveal it fully. On the other hand, he must remember enough of it so that he will not be tempted to look at it again in the future. He must know how to carry his criticism far enough, but also be able to determine the exact point at which it must be stopped. . . But all this is not yet enough. He must avoid speaking too frequently of dogmas. It will not do to expose them to the light. The works of Marx, like the Bible of the Catholics, are dangerous to those who want to read them without a director of conscience. There is one such director in every party cell and if one has doubts, they should be discussed with him. Communists should not even be presented too often in novels or plays: if they have faults they may not be liked; if they are too perfect, they may prove boring. . .

Well known authors who are Communists will be adduced against me. I recognize that they once had talent. The point is that they no longer have any. The essence of the work of art is opposed to bourgeois utilitarianism. Is it to be argued that it can accommodate itself to Communist utilitarianism? In an authentic revolutionary party, art would find an atmosphere which would allow it to blossom, for the liberation of Man and the advent of the classless society are, like the work of art, absolute ends. . . But the CP today is caught up in the infernal round of means—one must take and hold key positions, i.e. acquire means to acquire still other means. When ends are pushed farther and farther into the background, when means dominate everything, then the work of art also become a means; it enters into the round, its ends and principles become exterior to itself, it is governed from outside, it no longer demands anything, it grips man by the stomach or lower parts. The writer may maintain the semblance of talent, i.e. the art to coin words which are brilliant, but inside something has died, literature has become propaganda. . .

A collaborationist journalist once wrote: " 'To Maintain' — that is the slogan of the National Revolution!" But now a Communist intellectual

writes: " 'To Produce' — that is the true Revolution!" Things have gone so far that a recent poster proclaimed: "To vote for the Communist Party, means to vote for the defense of property!" Linguistic reality has become very complicated nowadays. Who isn't a socialist now? In the United States the word "Communist" covers everyone who does not vote Republican and in Europe every citizen who does not vote Communist is called a Fascist. . . The function of the writer is to call things by their right names. If words are sick today, it is our task to cure them. Instead, many live by this very sickness. . .

Everything is lost if we are to *choose* between the powers that prepare war. To choose the USSR means to renounce formal liberties without the hope of even gaining material liberties. The backwardness of its industry will not permit the USSR, in case of victory, to organize Europe. This means that misery and dictatorship would continue. But after an American victory, with the CP annihilated, the working class apathetic, disoriented and atomized and capitalism the more pitiless since it would then be master of the whole world, could one then really believe in the chances of a revolutionary movement that would have to start from scratch? But who forces us to choose? Is it really by choosing between totalities, simply because they are given, and by going over to the stronger, that one makes history? Or, on the contrary, is it not rather that historic action is never reduced to a choice between raw given realities, but always characterized by the invention of new solutions using the given point of departure? This respect for the given is pure and simple empiricism, but modern man has abandoned empiricism in science, morality and in individual life. . . Between the USSR and the Anglo-Saxon bloc, one must choose. But Socialist Europe cannot be "chosen" because it does not exist! It has to be built. . . The chances of literature are linked to the growth of a Socialist Europe, i.e. to a grouping of states with democratic and collectivist structures, with every state, to begin with, giving up part of its sovereignty to the profit of the whole. Only thus can we hope to avoid war; only then will the circulation of ideas on the Continent remain free and literature again find an object and a public. Since we are writers, it is our duty to help build Europe—by our writings.

DIFFICULTIES OF A "MOLOTOV PLAN"

The *Manchester Guardian Weekly* for August 21, 1947 carries an appraisal of the chances for an economic bloc of Eastern Europe which is worth close study in view of current discussions concerning the economic future of Russia's European satellites:

Russia's recent economic agreements with the countries in her sphere of interest have aroused a good deal of attention. Although in form they represent no new departure, the announcement of half a dozen agreements, all within a fortnight from the rejection of the Marshall offer, can hardly be a coincidence. Some observers see in the agreements the beginnings of a "Molotov plan" designed to outbid the Marshall offer.

Can such an interpretation be placed on the new agreements? It should be borne in mind, in the first place, that they are bilateral agreements for the exchange of goods; they involve no economic help in the form of loans, credits, lend-lease, or self-help. Russia exports mainly grain, cotton, iron ore, some metals and alloys, and in the

case of the Balkan countries some light machinery; she receives rails, railway equipment, heavy machinery, mineral oil, metallic ores, cement, and other producer goods. A striking feature of the new agreements is the substantial increase in the volume of reciprocal trade. In the agreement with Hungary, for example, the value of trade for the next year is fixed at $70,000,000, which is roughly equivalent to Hungary's total exports in 1946. The agreement with Czechoslovakia provides likewise for a spectacular increase in trade.

Trade With The West

For some time past the foreign trade of these two countries has moved markedly to the West. The other countries of the zone are still doing the greater part of their external trade within the area, but almost everywhere trade with the West has been showing an increase.

The explanation of that trend is not far to seek. The economies of the countries of Eastern Europe are not to any great extent complementary. They possess and lack virtually the same productive resources, and the layout of their communications does not favor interchange. Although for a variety of reasons the pre-war figures of their foreign trade are by no means conclusive, it is not without significance that no country in the area did more than a quarter of its foreign trade inside the region. For Poland and Bulgaria the proportion was less than 10 per cent.

Statistics apart, Czechoslovakia's diversified industries depend on a wide variety of raw materials and machinery, available only in the West, which is also her traditional outlet for her important export trade in luxury and semi-luxury goods. All the other countries are normally large exporters of foodstuffs, and nearly all export timber.

But what of the long-term aspect? Will Poland go on exporting coal rather than developing her own industries? It has been argued that changes in the area's production structure would completely alter the pattern of foreign trade and, indeed, that a continuation of the pre-war pattern would bar the way to large-scale economic development.

The validity of the argument can be best examined on the agreements concluded during the last few months between various pairs of countries (other than Russia) in the Russian sphere. These agreements are usually more comprehensive in scope than are those with Russia. They are long-term agreements, providing for a measure of co-ordination in the industrialization programs, and in the case of the Czechoslovak - Polish agreement also for joint planning committees. Under this agreement Czechoslovakia is to deliver during the next five years machinery and installations in the value of 7.5 billion crowns. An agreement on similar lines was made between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and more recently between Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria.

Long Term Needs

Those who view these agreements as part of the Russian answer to the Marshall approach overlook three things. In the first place, the realization of these long-term agreements depends on increased Czechoslovak imports of equipment and raw materials from the West, and the new Russian - Czechoslovak trade agreement runs directly counter to that. Secondly, in addition to the supply of capital equipment there is a process of greatly increased real saving involved. None of the countries in the zone has a

surplus of saving over its own needs, and for some, at least, the required saving may prove too much. But, what is more important in the long run, any large-scale industrial development in East Central Europe depends on a large internal market which can only be found in a prosperous agriculture. By common consent the main line of development for the area's agricultural resources lies in the direction of an intensified agriculture and of food industries. Such development, in its turn, depends on an enlarged outlet for high-quality food, and for a long time to come the market can only be found in the West. Seen in this light, trade with the West is a condition of the area's economic development, not an obstacle to it.

In the last analysis, the conception of a self-contained Eastern economic block suffers from a fundamental weakness. The block would be centered on a country—Soviet Russia—which is economically more backward than some of its satellites; a country unable to supply the block's requirements in capital equipment and to absorb, in exchange, its surplus of high-quality food. True, Russia did carry out her own Industrial Revolution with a minimum of intercourse with the outside world; but then she had a wide range of undeveloped industrial resources and no problem of population pressure.

Undoubtedly Russia can, if she chooses, use political means to divert the trade, production, and development of her satellites from the direction that corresponds to their resources and needs. She may even reap some short-term benefit from doing so, by fixing the prices of the goods to be exchanged under her bilateral agreements to her own advantage. But it is none the less clear that such action would hamper the economic recovery of these countries, and may well drag down their standards of living to her own.

BOOKS

SOME WONDERS OF THE RUSSIAN TONGUE

Bertram D. Wolfe

I am one of those hapless mortals who is condemned to read what Turgeniev once called "the great, powerful, truthful and free Russian tongue," with the aid of a dictionary. Next to the telephone book there would appear to be no more dismal consecutive reading than a dictionary. Gone are the days when a crotchety lexicographer could indulge his feelings as Dr. Johnson did when he defined *oats* as "food for horses, and, in Scotland, for humans." Modern dictionaries are collective, cumulative, standardized compilations, informative but uninspired and uninspiring. At least, so I thought until I began to consult the highly useful abridged *Russko-Angliiski Slovar,* published by *Ogiz-Gis,* or, by the State Publishing House for Foreign and National Dictionaries.

Naturally, I did not set out to read the dictionary from *abazhur* to *yashchik* as consecutive reading. No, I perused Russian books and papers, and, in moments of confusion, turned to this little compendium for help and enlightenment. It is a good dictionary for its size—none better—and it rarely failed me. Only gradually did I become aware of the fact that other words on the page might be more interesting than the one I was seeking.

For most words there was the Russian, and then, without more ado, a single English equivalent, e.g. *"ventilyator, ventilator"* or *"verblyud,* camel." No less natural was it to find occasional words like *"velikii,* great," first defined and then illustrated by the expression, *"velikie derzhavy,* great powers," or even to find that *"vera,* faith," was illustrated with the expression "faith in the revolutionary cause" without any hint that there might also be a faith denominated as religious.

It was when I stumbled across the word, *"pyad,* span or inch," that I first began to note the unexpected qualities of this usually so laconic book. For after the word "inch" I found, *"Ni odnoi pyadi chuzhoi zemli ne xotim; no i svoei zemli ne otdadim nikomu* (Stalin)" and after that, in English: "We do not want a single foot of foreign territory; but we will not surrender a single inch of our territory to any one (Stalin)". Thus not only was foreign territory inexplicably measured in feet and domestic in inches, but the tiny, simple seeming word, *inch,* occupied not one line but eight in this usually so laconic and tightly abridged dictionary.

Anxiously I glanced at the date of publication (1942) and wondered how, after the annexation of half of Poland, part of Finland, and all of Bessarabia, Lithuania, Latvia and Esthonia, a dictionary published in Moscow could still be renouncing every single foot of foreign territory. I hastily turned to the letter *L* and on page 111 found *"Litovskaya Sovetskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika,*

BERTRAM D. WOLFE contributes frequent reviews to the New York *Herald Tribune,* New York *Times, American Mercury* and other periodicals. Among his numerous books is *Diego Rivera: His Life and Times.* He is at present engaged in writing a history of the Russian Revolution.

the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic," whence I concluded that this particular foot of ground had not been rejected. Still I felt an inexplicable conflict between the definition of *pyad* and that of *Litovskaya* until I noted that besides the publication date 1942 (which accounts for the second) there was also the note "printed from plates of 1939" which accounted for the retention of the first. I breathed easier, but somebody may yet get purged for this failure to keep uptodate in definitions . . .

II

After that, I could never resist the temptation to stray from the word I was seeking, usually so coldly and briefly defined, to any other on the page that happened to have a lot of type after it. My habit of straying from the strait and narrow path was often surprisingly rewarded, for this proved to be a dictionary in which some select words gave you not only definitions but something to think about.

Thus if *"voina,* war" on page 30 was followed by "imperialist war" and "civil war" but not by "Great Patriotic War," you could blame it on the "plates of 1939," and ponder on the change of fashions in the meanings and affective overtones of words, and the mutability of pacts and attitudes towards war. Or, if *"smertnost,* mortality" was bloodily illustrated by *"smertnaya kasn,* capital punishment" and *"smertnyi prigovor,* death sentence," it inspired reflections on what progress has been made since the Soviet Union abolished the death penalty in 1947, in order to lessen the opposition of other countries to returning Russian refugees. And reflections, no less, on the superior economic uses to the state of working prisoners to death in concentration camps rather than wasting a bullet on them along with their potential labor power.

But it is time to let the dictionary speak for its inimitable self, in words culled at random, since I have still not started to read it from *abazhur* to *yashchik.* On page 79 under *"znamya,* banner" the reader will find in both languages "to hold aloft the banner of Lenin and Stalin," which surely should help him to use the word properly. Under *"nezavisimo,* independently" on p. 140, there is a lengthy aid to proper use: "the equality of the rights of the citizens of the USSR, independently or irrespective of their nationality or race, is an indefeasible law," which mouthful gives *nezavisimo* ten lines instead of one. This business of "rights" moreover seems to have bothered the lexicographers for on p. 136 under *"natsionalnost,* nationality," we again find the same statement about the "indefeasible law" in all its amplitude. And on p. 200 under *"podlinnik,* original" and *"podlinnyi,* genuine" we find the genuine exemplification in the sentence: "genuine democracy is carried out in the U.S.S.R." I wondered about the English words "carried out" until I was brought up short by the added expression, "*s podlinnym verno,* checked and found correct." And, unexpectedly, under *"neprelozhnyi,* immutable," there is the illustration: "the equality of rights of the citizens of the USSR is an immutable law." To silence doubt, follow the words, *"neprelozhnaya istina,* indisputable truth."

Perhaps the climax in lengthy illustration of the definition of a short word comes with *"pravo,* right." No Soviet dictionary could let it go at that. There are 22 lines of exemplification, including such rights as "the right to vote" (but not to choose between candidates or tickets), "the right of self-determination," "the right of asylum," "the right to work in the

USSR is ensured by the socialist organization of national economy," and "citizens of the USSR have the right to rest and leisure which is ensured by the institution of annual vacations with pay." How touching to have so many exemplifications of the word "right" on a page where other and more difficult words must go badly defined and unexemplified!

But not every word, for on the selfsame page, as if the alphabet itself or the paging were the work of a diversionist or wrecker, is the word which droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven, *"poshchada,* mercy" with the truly startling exemplification by the sentence "no mercy for the enemies of the people!" (exclamation point in the original). And when it began to seem to me in my simplicity that that was a poor exemplification of the word "mercy" I found my answer under the simple word *"tot,"* meaning "that," which was followed by the disconcerting *"tem samyn vy prisnaete svoyu oshibky,* by that you confess your mistake." Lest I demur further, the dictionary added severely *"tem khuzhe,* so much the worse for you."

RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LIBERAL

Bertram D. Sarason

The opening pages of Lionel Trilling's first and remarkable novel, *The Middle of the Journey,*[1] a work that is destined to be an American classic, introduce us to two characters whom the average reader — particularly the average reader with a modicum of interest in politics—will recognize at once. One is the hero, John Laskell, en route to Crannock (just beyond Hartford) to recuperate and to be in the vicinity of his liberal friends, the Crooms. Laskell is an authority on housing, and rather a leftist. He has been ill with a disease that is crucial to everyone but more so to leftists than anyone else: he has had *scarlet fever.* His train companion, the second of the two characters whom the reader will find familiar, is Gifford Maxim. Maxim is not, like Laskell, just out of the hospital; rather he is just out of the Party and is trying the religious cure. But whether Maxim will ever recover from the effects of political scarlet fever remains to be seen.

Before long the reader will find that Laskell is not just any typical liberal and Maxim not any mere ex-Party member. For Mr. Trilling is opposed to the creation of types in art as well as in life; he is as much against the Farrell-Steinbeck abstractions (the poor are always good and the rich are always bad) as he is against the social abstractions that the corporate state makes of its individuals, or the progressive educator of his students, or possessive parents of their children. Mr. Trilling's vision is one of courageous individualism, and he therefore lets his characters live and work out their own fates.

Mr. Trilling's aesthetic then, is itself a challenge to the notion that man is completely socially conditioned; and his characters, although they are comprehensible on their own dramatic level, take on more significance to the reader endowed with a philosophical and political background against which questions of freedom and necessity are raised. For the reader who brings to

[1] *The Middle of the Journey* by Lionel Trilling. Viking Press, New York. $3.

BERTRAM D. SARASON is Assistant Professor of English at New Haven State Teachers College, New Haven, Connecticut.

this work a cognizance of recent history—authoritarianism in Nazi Germany and Communist Russia, the isolationism of the democracies before World War II, the Spanish Civil War, and the present and past infiltrations of Stalinism—will see that the predicament of the Laskells, the Maxims, and the Crooms is a microcosm of the larger events of our time.

Such analogies can be illustrated by the dilemma faced by Nancy Croom in her relationship with Duck Caldwell, the irresponsible handyman in her employ. She and her husband Arthur are the good-intending liberals of the novel. Their humanitarianism has led them to the popular notion that man is simply a product of his environment, and that man's digressions therefore are environmental rather than personal. It is the philosophy, familiar to all of us, which purports to defend the underdog, the Duck Caldwells of society. The Crooms find that they cannot use the terms "right" and "wrong" in their relationship to Duck, for since things are only "valid" and "necessary" moral censure does not harmonize with the revolutionary or the progressive or the liberal outlook. "Tell him we are angry," is all that Nancy can say to Arthur when they learn that Duck has failed to fulfill his responsibility of picking up their friend Laskell at the Crannock railroad station, on the occasion of the convalescent Laskell's arrival. It is implicit that Duck has failed a hundred times, and that the Crooms have done nothing before and will do nothing now. For the Crooms have lost the sense of individuality—Duck is a proletarian and they are humanitarians — and such types, so goes the unwritten law, must never clash.

Nancy, of course, has to suppress a perfectly normal desire to castigate and to pass judgment on Duck. But she is compelled psychologically to suppress her individuality: she plays out her abstract, her type, her corporate role as Nancy the humanitarian. (Mr. Trilling emphasizes the manner in which the will, when it would disguise its shame, masks itself in virtue.) Thus, Duck must somehow be made to justify Nancy's do-nothingness; he must be made good; and therefore Nancy says of him (with superb unconscious irony), "Duck is so *real.*" At the same time Nancy deceives herself into the belief that Nancy is, after all, so real—an identity, a person indeed—a good person incapable of malevolence towards others, which explains in turn the myth and image of herself as an admirer of the simple, the comman man. Obviously, Nancy can never see Duck for what he is. Such psychological projection is at the bottom a form of authoritarianism, for it refuses to permit reality to individuals since it requires the individual to conform to the mental archetype.

Just as Nancy and Arthur are blind to the "real" Duck, so their obsession for Gifford Maxim stems from the same blindness to their own desires. Liberal humanitarianism, observes Laskell, is a false, a sentimental, a lactic version of life in which:

> "A careful, shabby Hindu student and a skinny Methodist student shake hands and agree that there are no real differences between people that cannot be overcome by mutual understanding and education and the cider and doughnuts they will presently be offered by the religious director."

Yet, Laskell is to discover as he finds himself, ferocity and sexuality are native to us; and our shame in the possession of these traits results in will-masking, self-deceptions, and

authoritarianisms. Maxim, the Communist, attracts Laskell and the Crooms as a symbol of power; but the Crooms can think of him only in terms of their projected image of themselves, that is, as a man fighting for justice and bearing the burden of human suffering. They are ashamed of their own unconscious appetite for power, their own sexuality; and therefore they do not see in Maxim the man whom Laskell is finally to root out: the sexual and political homicide.

Towards Duck, Nancy is to reach a distressing ambivalence. She believes he has killed his own child (actually he has been an unwitting agent in the act); and despite her belief that man is amoral, that he is a creature of circumstances, she does not want Duck to remain in her employ—yet theory triumphs, and she finally acquieses in his staying. The Crooms are never to know that Duck has committed one great masterpiece of perversion: he has permitted Laskell to have his wife Emily in order to have something to hold over Laskell's head for that hypothetical moment in which he would have to get "security"—a job. Duck would control Laskell by making him pay off for his guilt. This technique of undermining the will is a device which Maxim has also used on Laskell, and Nancy (who has been Maxim's pupil) had attempted a psychological hold on Laskell too by a cunning allusion to Ferdinand, that bull who "was disgraced but safe," the symbol of the liberal who was absent when needed in the Spanish Civil War.

The possession and the imputation of guilt become cardinal in the dynamics of the characters in the life of Laskell. He realizes that shame suppressed induces false flights of the will, mere verbalisms which dress up aggressions in the garment of political, religious, and ethical idealism. And he realizes too that shame suppressed cannot stand its own embodiment in other persons, and that it must create fantasies about persons, must see them as images of one's own imagined "good self." Thus Maxim, the Communist, and Duck, the proletarian, are never seen by the Crooms—who are shame-ridden for their suppressed desire for political power and sexuality—in their true light: Maxim is the perennial idealist and Duck the perpetual victim of circumstances—all of which, of course, represents the Crooms own fantasies of themselves. Lastly, Laskell awakens to the fact that guilt seeks to recreate itself in others for the purpose of dominating others.

One is in a position now to connect Mr. Trilling's narrative with historical fact. Like Nancy Croom the liberals would like to have dismissed a variety of suspect murderers, Hitler, Franco, Mussolini. Yet they were incapable of making a moral judgment in an amoral world which they created. (Were we not literally dragged into World War II?) It was not the environmental theory of morals alone that caused stultification: it was a hopeless trying to live up to sentimental humanitarian ideals, in which we saw ourselves as immaculate pacificists, that rendered a stand untenable. But how did we come to assume the pure but impotent role? Because we were guilt-ridden—with Manchuria, Versailles, Wilson, the Robber Barons, Beard's interpretation of the Constitution, and a thousand aberrations which the Fascists, the Communists, and our own progressive educators were ready to take out of their dossiers to render our wills paralytic. Our first habit of mind to alter, notes Laskell, is to get over the middle-class preoccupation with the Future and settle our scores with

the Past: that is, to assert our own innocence, to refuse to be undermined by the accusers at home and abroad who are exploiting our unconscious guilts. We will then have no compulsion to apologize for our own evil by not seeing evil in others. In short, we will not err in seeing Maxim, the authoritarian, as a saint and hero; and we will not see Maxim's political counterpart, Soviet Russia, apotheosized. We will grasp, too, the Soviet "charges" against the Democracies.

For the incredible fact remains that Russia still exerts a hold on a host of "pinks" and "fellow-travellers." They see Russia as the Crooms saw Maxim and Duck; they see a fiction of their own devising; they see Russia as a victim of historical circumstance; they are blind to the ruthless exercise of power by the Stalin gang—to them it is *Realpolitik*—for they have not come to terms with their own past and their suppressed drives.

Maxim's defection from the Party and his date with Calvinism before his debauch with a Higher Orthodoxy is Mr. Trilling's way of tracking down the various guises of authoritarianism. The Party of the Moscow Trials, with its sensational confessionals, offers the corporate will to the brotherhood in guilt; and the new theologies of our time offers Corporate Mercy to the brotherhood of original sinners. Maxim's change therefore is simply from one authority to another. No real shift of position has occurred; the denial of the individual and his innocence is basic to Communism as it is to Christian Orthodoxy; the sense of guilt is still with Maxim. Yet his abysmal ignorance of himself is not half so pathetic as the unwitting want of self-realization in the liberal Crooms: for it is they who are permitting political and religious tyrannies to flourish by an obsessional sympathy which attaches itself to objects that are themselves compassionless, ruthless, and destructive.

A SOCIAL DISEASE

Rose Laub

> *Behold! human beings living in an underground den, which has a mouth open towards the light and reaching all along the den; here they have been from their childhood, and have their legs and necks chained so that they cannot move, and can only see before them, being prevented by the chains from turning round their heads, . . . and they see only their own shadows . . .*
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> Plato, *The Republic*

I

Materialist interpretation of history, economic or technological theories,—all these have failed to grasp fully the absurdity and the horror of a world ruled though by the rigorous application of the laws of technical efficiency and economic reward. By what "historical laws" can we explain the extermination of millions?

No wonder that today it has become a fashion to delve in the depths of the human soul or of the unconscious, to discover therein the secret of the condition of man. The evil must be inherent in the individual.

Some of the contributors of this little volume,[1] which attempts to lay

[1] *Anti-Semitism, A Social Disease.* Edited by Ernst Simmel, M.D., International Universities Press, New York, 137 pp. $2.50.

ROSE LAUB is a post-graduate student in sociology and psychology at Columbia University.

bare the roots of the contemporary scourge of antisemitism, take this view. Ernst Simmel considers antisemitism, although the title of the book calls it a "social disease," a psychopathological personality disturbance and finds that the human race suffers from a pathology of hate. He agrees with Le Bon that disaster stems from the fact that "the modern individual, in increasing degree, has the tendency to give up life as an individual and to submerge his ego into a crowd." "The mass wanders along the borderland of the unconscious, because it is governed by instinctual drives of destruction and wildness, which slumber in every one of us." In Simmel's own words: Mass psychosis, just as the psychosis of an individual, is precipitated by a break of the ego with reality. The mass and the psychotic think and act irrationally, because of regressively disintegrated ego systems. The ego, submerging itself into a pathological mass, saves itself from individual regression by regressing collectively. Flight into a mass psychosis is therefore an escape not only from reality, but also from individual insanity.

According to Bernhard Berliner, antisemitism is based upon a racial-historically determined psychological disposition of the Jews themselves. They created the monotheistic religion and with it a rigid patriarchate of priests. This paternalistic spirit in religion and culture is the manifestation of a strong super-ego, which makes for a specific disposition to anxiety and to depressive and masochistic trends. Thus it seems that antisemitism is a result of the Jew's instinctual drive; his "ecstatic submissiveness . . . is an expression of his super-ego as a trend of racial psychology."

This psychologizing approach, which does not differentiate between the social body of the group and the organic constitution of the individual, is not shared by the late Otto Fenichel. Contrariwise, Fenichel makes it clear that a *social* disease cannot be made the subject matter of psychoanalytic interpretation and delimits the study of the social phenomenon from that of individual psychic dynamics. He limits himself to dealing in the main with the *psychological* disease, in his own terms: to the "psychoanalysis of the antisemite."

"The psychoanalysis of antisemites is indispensable," Fenichel declares, "if antisemitism is to be understood. But it is in no way sufficient to explain it. . . The question of the social function of the antisemite reaction will still remain unanswered . . . The psychological mass basis for antisemitism, whatever it may be, existed in 1925 too, but antisemitism was not a political force then. If an understanding of its origin and development in that ten-year period in Germany is sought, then the investigation must be focused on what happened there during those years, and not on the comparatively unaltered unconscious." If antisemitic propaganda could be effective among the masses and if antisemitic slogans could have been made the rallying call for a mass following, they must fulfill certain psychological needs of the individual. Fenichel proceeds to analyze that which is reacting, or rather that which can be made to react in the specific social situation. (1) Antisemitism gives the means of satisfying two contradictory tendencies: rebellion against unsatisfactory social conditions and respect for authority. By making the powerless seem powerful, rebellious action, instead of being directed against the really powerful, is being channeled in a manner which is sanctioned by authority. (2) But why are the Jews especially suitable as "scapegoats"?

They have resisted assimilation due to the ghetto into which they were forced, but also due to their own stubborn acceptance of the ghetto pattern. Compelled and accepting to remain individual traders in the midst of an increasingly industrialized and centralized society, they retained peculiarities of their hosts which these hosts themselves had given up long since. They are strangers who remind others of something archaic, something which the non-Jew was compelled to give up under the constraints of civilization. As traders, they were clever, and at the same time appeared to be connected with old primeval powers. (3) As strangers with archaic cultural traits, they are suspected of retaining all anti-social traits which the modern individual has learned to repress. By making the Jew appear murderous, dirty and debauched, the antisemite can avoid becoming aware of these tendencies in himself.

"For the unconscious of the rioters," Fenichel writes, "the Jew represents not only the authorities whom they do not dare to attack, but also their own repressed instincts which they hate and which are forbidden by the very authorities against whom they are directed. Antisemitism is a condensation of the most contradictory tendencies: instinctual rebellion directed against the authorities, and the cruel suppression and punnshment of this instinctual rebellion, directed against oneself. Unconsciously for the antisemite, the Jew is simultaneously the one against whom he would liek to rebel, and the rebellious tendencies within himself."

(4) As eternally oppressed and frequently framed, the Jew appears wicked and vengeful, for the antisemite, knowing how revengeful he himself would be, cannot imagine that the oppressed are not revengeful. Contempt and disregard of the Jew helps the antisemite to overcome his fear. The Jew, with his tenacious resistance against assimilation and annihilation, by his very presence reminds the antisemite of the danger of retaliation—a danger which the antisemite tries to overcome by proving to himself how easy it is to attack the defenseless Jew.

For antisemitism to be effective as a political weapon, there must prevail an intense discontent with the existing state of affairs. Fenichel poses the question whether in the United States the recent increase in antisemitism is an index of increased mass discontent. Here, he says, is the limit of any psychological explanation. The economic and political circumstances, under which the psychological factors just discussed may become politically effective, cannot be the subject matter of psychoanalysis.

II

Let us now confront a few of the speculative hypotheses elaborated in this volume with some relevant historical and sociological data.

Berliner presents a few valid arguments. But in his concentration upon one particular aspect of the problem, he not only fails to grasp the totality of the phenomenon, but also, in places, disregards a reality which does not fit into his theoretical construct. To prove that "it is not only the Jew's hate that gnaws at the Jew's God," but that "it is the hate of some Christians as well," i.e., of those Christians of "Protestant denominations" who "are closer to the paternalistic principle of the Old Testament," Berliner states that "it is well known that antisemitism is not as strong in Catholic countries as in countries with preponderantly Protestant population." But it so happens that just the contrary is true! Mass antisemitism existed in Poland and in Russia long

before it existed in Germany, and in pre-World War I days overt antisemitism existed in Austria, Hungary, etc., much more than in Germany. Nazi antisemitism started out in Catholic Bavaria, where during the whole period of Hitler's power it was stronger than in any other part of the country. On the other hand, it never existed in its overt manifestations in the Scandinavian countries, in England and in Holland.

The lack of clear definition—e.g., of what kind of antisemitic movement one is talking about—is especially evident in Simmel's paper. Indeed, it should be impossible to define a "movement," which is a social concept, in psychoanalytic terms, and Simmel is thus forced to theorize about the *collective psyche* as Le Bon, whom Simmel quotes extensively, did before him. Whatever the scientific value of Le Bon's work, he was concerned with the movements of the French Revolution, which were genuine mass movements of the oppressed aimed at obtaining genuine satisfactions from tyrannical rulers. Simmel, however, is concerned — so I understand — with German Nazism. But German Nazism was never a mass movement in that sense. The Nazi "vanguard" was out to prevent any mass movement which might have moved beyond their control; they obtained power by so-called legal means, or by a *coup d'etat.* What the Nazis needed, and what they obtained, was a *mass following* rather than a mass movement,—people who marched rather than people who acted.

If any psychoanalytic appraisal of the average German who accepted Nazism should be made, it was not that his "ego was immature as a result of super-ego weakness," but rather that his super-ego demands were too strong, that his ego was weak because its energies were needed to meet the strict super-ego demands. (The super-ego in Freudian terminology has the function of adjusting the ego to the values of society.) The average middle-class German obeyed the law *spontaneously,* so to speak, not only under threat of terror. One obeys, because that is what's being done; one does not interfere in other people's affairs, not because one has no concern for others, but because it's bad manners. The average German antisemite was a "good citizen" and not one who "discharged his pent-up aggressive instinct energies into the object world." What Simmel has in mind are the pogromists. But in Germany there were no mass pogroms. The frightening aspect about Nazi antisemitism is that the extermination of millions was a model of orderliness and rational organization, that it was not carried out by a mass movement—quite to the contrary, special care was taken to conceal the matter as much as possible from the population. Thus the German antisemite—be he the follower or the executioner—was not the man who was "submerged in the crowd" and who felt that, whatever he might do, "impunity is assured to him." His actions and movements were carefully prescribed and defined and he abode conscientiously by the rules. It is interesting to note that once, when the Nazis called for a people's movement in 1938, when they attempted to arouse the Germans to a pogrom, the people did not respond. The mistreating of Jews and Jewish property was carried out mainly by Hitler-Youth boys of puberty age or by the delinquent type, the SA—they, indeed, "discharged their pent-up aggressive instinct energies" in this manner. But they did not constitute the majority of Nazi followers and antisemites. The mass of the people did not respond to the rabble-rousing,

mainly because "it wasn't the right thing to do," it wasn't "orderly." The antisemitism of the bulk of Nazi followers, the "yes-men," could be termed *passive* antisemitism, as against the *active* antisemitism of the pogromists of pre-war Poland, for example.

I would suggest that, psychoanalytically speaking, we can distinguish between two kinds of antisemites: the "puritan" type, whose super-ego demands are so strict that he shuns all awareness of his own needs and drives; their suppression costs him so much psychic energy that his weakened ego can meet reality only by projecting the repressed drives onto the outgroup; the "delinquent" type who has a weak super-ego formation, whose ego is overwhelmed by his impulses and thus is not strong enough consciously to control them. It is only this latter type which Simmel has in mind when he bluntly states that "certainly antisemites do not suffer from inhibitions." Antisemitism is such a powerful weapon in crisis situations not only for the reasons outlined by Fenichel, but also because it serves the psychic condition of both the asocial type and the conformist type—the *lumpenproletariat* and the middle classes—in a social situation of general insecurity.

The fact that antisemitism is not mainly an expression of the ego's break with reality, but may appeal exactly to those who have internalized authority to such an extent that they seem very well adjusted, is substantiated by the research report on *The Antisemitic Personality* by Else Frankel Brunswick and R. Nevitt Sanford in this same volume.[2]

The most outstanding feature of the antisemitic college women tested seems to be a restricted, narrow personality with a strict, conventional super-ego, to which there is complete surrender and which takes over the function of the underdeveloped ego. These girls showed less evidence of pronounced maladjustment than the girls low in antisemitism, who were less at ease socially, and whose life histories have been less happy or fortunate by ordinary standards than those of the high extremes.

The highly antisemitic girls tended automatically to support the *status quo.* They took their convictions directly from their parents and showed an uncritical devotion to them and to authority in general. In their fantasies, however, hatred, meanness, jealousy and suspicion came out with emphasis when parental figures were being treated.

Among them we find emphasis on high morals, kindness and charity, cleanliness, good manners, and honesty. Significantly, they cite as "the most embarrassing experience," i.e., what they fear most, violations of manners and conventions. On the other hand, aggressive themes stand out in their tests, and their preoccupation with destruction is markedly pronounced and extreme. These same girls regard the Jews as *aggressive, dishonest* and *dirty.*

These girls show aversion against emotionality; they keep themselves pure and reputable by projecting on socially designated out-groups the basic impulses which they try to repress. Their repressed sexual strivings have acquired a dangerous and sadistic connotation. Asked to make up a story about a picture representing a Negro with a policeman, one of the girls

[2]Centered around the analysis of the records of twenty female college students, 8 of them high, 8 low, and 4 intermediate on the antisemitism scale.

says: "This man has just been captured for a crime of strong brutality . . . He attacked some girl, he beat her, raped her, killed her, and cut her up and threw her in the bushes."

We understand now why the Jew is supposed to "cut your throat for a nickel," why he is called "dirty," "aggressive" and of "low sexual morals."

From Fenichel's theory and from the empirical findings reported above I would conclude that hostility against minorities is a necessary by-product of an authoritarian society—a society based on the repression of basic desires and needs on the one hand, and on devotion to authority on the other.

The Jewish minority, as an outgroup, is especially suited to serve as a scapegoat. The Jew appears archaic and foreign, though actually participating in the economic and intellectual life of the society; he appears powerful individually due to his resistance to assimilation and his ensuing intellectual and economic activities, though actually he is completely powerless in society. Thus he seems sufficiently mighty to carry out his alleged lust for power, murder and debauche, being at the same time sufficiently weak to invite punishment from those who frantically avoid awareness of their own unconscious desires—those to whom even a reminder of such traits causes unbearable anxiety.

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